" The Great Arctic War " : " La Guerre au dessus du continent blanc " vue par un think-tank Etasunien

Alors que la Russie est accusée d' " Imperialismee " en Arctique , les stratèges Etazuniens se preparent à l'eventualité d'un conflit pour le contrôle de cette région .
Ce texte est publié par le tres officiel " Institute of the North "
http://www.institutenorth.org/
Il se presente sous la forme de quatre scenarii , selon l'evolution de la situation politique internationale et l'evolution de la demande en matières premières .
Le premier scenario developpé se situe dans un contexte d'augmentation de la demande en matières premières et dans un unilateralisme des acteurs internationaux ( Etats ) et privés ( multinationales ) .
Les auteurs se sont inspirés des scenarii developpés par Shell à la findes années 70 sur un embrago petrolier de l'OPEP .

Des lignes que n'aurait pas renié le Capitaine DANRIT .
On notera , les fantasmes qui hantent les Etats-Unis : Une alliance Chine - Russie - Venezuela et l'adoption de l'Euro comme monnaie d'echange .

Scenario 1 - Etape 1 . Le Debut ;2009-2010
" In early 2010, images of the largest ever Canadian military exercise above the Arctic Circle, featuring new
special “Ice Ranger” units and patrol boats with ice re-enforced hulls, splashed across newspapers and media
sites around the world. The CBC offered a live broadcast; a video clip of the exercise—titled “Start of the Next
Cold War?”—was posted to YouTube and was viewed more than 15 million times within 15 days. Quite
quickly, the Arctic was back in the spotlight of world attention as it had been several years earlier. And just like
that, territorial tensions around Arctic seabed sovereignty were rekindled.
Russia, the U.S., and the European Arctic states moved to stake their claims too, with similarly symbolic moves.
In 2012, as part of the war on terror, the Americans established Fort Prudhoe in Alaska. The Danes announced
an offshore patrol plan in Greenland, citing the recent tourist ship grounding of the MV Greenland Adventurer.
All Arctic states undertook security and feasibility studies, gathering more and more evidence to support their
many claims. Attracted by the reported resources, private companies got into the act too, testing the waters with
government contracts and partnerships, even though cost-effective technologies remained elusive.
Competition, however, was not limited to the north. Countries vied with one another in many ways all around
the world—particularly the U.S. and China. Currency competition took a nasty turn shortly after the Beijing
Olympics when China made several significant shifts away from the U.S. dollar to the euro. Markets around the
world roiled with the news, and fortunes were made, lost, made, and lost again as investors of all sizes navigated
the waves.
New coalitions formed, one notably anchored by Venezuela, China, and Russia as an alternative to World Trade
Organization agreements that traced back to the Bretton Woods system of international monetary arrangements.
Countries outside of the Western power spheres that had created those institutions now found strength in
standing together, no longer in need of these aging arrangements. The next TRIPS rounds not only failed—they
were cancelled. Intellectual property standards were yet another arena for nations to test their power and will
against one another. Even internet protocol standards proved contentious, especially with the information and
speed requirements of Web 5.0.
Marine navigation standards were not excepted from these dynamics either. Competing national frameworks—
that were outside the International Maritime Organization process—were actually more about misinformation
and claiming greater levels of traffic, as well as capability, as a way to portray more influence and control. This
“activity inflation” then resulted in a more opaque picture of marine activity, giving nations even more urgency
in their race for resources in the north."

Etape 2 : 2020-2035 La Chine , l'Inde , la Norvege et le Japon entrent dans le " Grand Jeu "
Ici on notera le deuxieme fantasme Etasunien : Une alliance energetique Russo-Chinoise qui provoque un " detournement " des exportations Russes de l'Europe vers la Chine .


By 2022, a trifecta of forces further ramped up both government and company-driven claims to the Arctic. First,
the development of truly scalable alternative energy sources arrived more slowly than many had expected.
Stubborn technical problems, along with confusion created by competing regional standards, meant “traditional”
energy sources remained the primary fuel for national economic engines. Second, Middle East tensions flared up
as the latest U.S.-led coalition squared off against Iran, once again calling into question long-term stability in the
region. And third, global temperatures rose faster than models projected, shifting rainfall patterns significantly
and putting nearly as much premium on water in some regions as on oil.

Literal legions of lawyers made arguments, counterarguments, appeals, and complaints in the international courts, various venues of the United Nations, and wherever else claims could be pressed. Agreements were
exceedingly rare and not always recognized by all parties. National leaders returned to the old adage “possession
is nine-tenths of the law”—and started funneling more funding toward military buildup, thus matching the
rhetoric of the previous 10 years. Nations emphasized “far north military presence” as a capability to be
developed. This meant not only specialized cold-weather forces, but also “hard water” classes of naval vessels.
Once again, national navies competed on size and force projection, engaging in exercises under the guise of
convey escorts, scientific expeditions, and coordinated search and rescue capabilities. Showdowns between
ships were not uncommon, playing a game of brinkmanship yet never reaching the point of actual engagement.
By 2025, China and India were developing navies that could guard their network of secure maritime transport
routes from energy states to their ports of Hong Kong, Shanghai, Calcutta, and Mumbai. China managed to sign
an energy deal with Russia, one that included significant reductions in the amount of gas and oil that Russia
would export to the EU. Russian-Chinese trade increased, with both countries making use of the Northern Sea
Route with well-publicized “demonstration voyages.” Norway, nervous about future Russian plans, reluctantly
decided to invest in more naval forces to protect its own Arctic interests. Japan did the same. Mariners began
calling the Bering Strait the “Bering Gate,” with U.S. and Russian patrols on continuous deployment.
The next year, the Canadian Arctic Lines shipping company was formed as a joint venture between the
Canadian government and a private shipping firm. The charter set out specific goals of “controlling Canadian
Arctic waterways for Canadian benefit.” This venture exemplified the necessity for close coordination between
national militaries and private partners, essentially “country companies.” Another partnership between the
Russian government and several international commercial companies (which were required to have Gazprom as
a significant shareholder) to more fully exploit the Shtokman fields also illustrated the point. Private vessels that
did venture into the region without military escort were labeled “rogue,” and turned back with heavy fines.
Sensing opportunity, so long as properly affiliated, some companies shifted north to the Arctic with an infusion
of people, capital, resources, and production facilities. Russia enacted the “Arctic Development Law” to attract
more qualified labor to the north, paying relocation costs. The barrage of development far surpassed the activity
involved in building past pipelines. This sort of rush led, not surprisingly, to poorly planned communities—and
therefore to rapid growth, congestion, and even sprawl. Although this military-backed development brought
infrastructure, it completely diverted efforts away from more sustainable economic sectors such as tourism.
By 2032, the regional divisions inspired by strategic, military, and commercial claims in the Arctic pervaded
international trade relationships. The five countries with coastal territory bordering the Arctic Ocean spoke of
forming an alliance—the Organization of Arctic Ocean States (OAOS)—against the sharing of Arctic resources
by other nations, potentially fracturing the G-20 as non-Arctic countries scrambled to align with the Arctic
resource-rich. Tourism disappeared as oil and gas buildup took precedence over preserving the more pristine
areas. Competition for claims over territory trumped attention to and concern for the environment, leaving a
number of spills and other oil and gas blowouts unpublicized and untreated. Increased seasonal thawing reduced
the thickness and extent of sea ice, further facilitating marine traffic and resource extraction. As the sea ice
melted more quickly, it took with it important aspects of local Arctic indigenous sustainable marine hunting use,
while simultaneously providing for extended fishing seasons. Global commercial fleets, at least those with the
proper geopolitical affiliations, were allowed to follow Arctic fisheries further north.
In anticipation of trans-Arctic shipping, Iceland established the Icelandic Commodities Exchange (ICE) route
between Dutch Harbor, Alaska, and Helquvik Port in Keflavik, Iceland. While marginally increasing regional
traffic into the Icelandic port, the lack of uniform laws and governance in the Arctic region prohibited ICE from
reaching its trans-Arctic potential.

2035-2050 - " The Bedford incident "
Aout 2045 : Une fregate Chinoise escortant un convoi methanier ouvre le feu sur un navire Japonais .

Between 2035 and 2040, several large Arctic communities were essentially overrun by military buildup.
Frequent low-level spills and dumping had already brought chronic maladies, but now protests erupted across
the Arctic. In 2041, various governments granted ad hoc compensatory damage payments. These payments,
however, fell short of the massive investments needed for the communities to adapt or relocate. Months after the
payments were offered, land claims became an issue in Russia, forcing more police presence. New tensions
emerged as a newly wealthy Siberia pushed back against Moscow, demanding more autonomy. International
terrorists threatened the Alaskan oil and gas pipelines, and in response, the National Guard was put on
permanent patrol. The U.S. took advantage of this general chaos by asserting jurisdiction over waters along a
boundary with Canada that had been the subject of dispute for decades. Because this was backed by the presence
of a U.S. Naval fleet, relations between the two neighbors hit their lowest point in memory. In retaliation,
Canada closed access to “its” Arctic waterways.
These were also the years when economic activity in the Arctic reached an all-time high, with real GDP growth
reaching 8 percent across the region. Of course, this development was not based on intra-Arctic relations. The
pursuit of physical resources expanded beyond oil and gas to hard minerals, some of which were in
extraordinarily high demand. In the rush for these resources, speed and security took priority, not surprisingly at
the expense of any environmental concerns. So the real surprise was water—fresh water. The lakes and rivers of
the Canadian and Russian Arctic had become a very valuable global commodity. Eager entrepreneurs formed
companies with names like “Arctic Source, Unlimited.” The Canadian Indigenous Water Federation sought
venture funding for an Arctic shuttle system of water tankers and terminals to supply climate-induced drought
areas. Tripoli and Abu Dhabi vied to become the first terminal to receive Arctic water.
In August, 2045, after loading at newly developed fields in the Kara Sea, Beijing’s latest pair of Arctic LNG
tankers, escorted by an ice-capable Chinese frigate, followed a Russian icebreaker east along the Northern Sea
Route for homeport. While crossing the Sea of Japan, a maneuvering misunderstanding resulted in the frigate
firing across the bow of a Japanese patrol vessel. The Japanese, claiming international rights, mobilized their
fleets, and for several days it appeared as if the one-hundredth anniversary of Japan’s surrender following World
War II would also be the first time since then that Japan engaged in Pacific warfare. Russia intervened, however,
feverishly shuttling political envoys through negotiations that diffused the situation and prevented an escalation
to war. Clashes and flare-ups continued with regularity, but threadbare diplomacy and bilateral agreements
helped to maintain relative peace. Although no nation supported universal standards that they had not originated,
the Arctic states pushed maritime technology and design forward.
In 2050, military and intelligence experts generally agreed that a Great Arctic War had narrowly been avoided
several times in recent years—and that if there were going to be a real world war of the 21st Century, it would
most likely be sparked in the open summer waters of the Arctic Ocean. Though most agreed that the potential
for real skirmishes, or worse, remained very strong .

(c)  Global Business Network - 2008