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  • : Blog initialement consacré à la géopolitique de l'Arctique . Il traite désormais de l'actualité politique , economique , socio-culturelle , historique et militaire et présente des analyses " non conformistes " .Il ne pretend pas à l' " objectivité " mais presente un point de vue alternatif , en opposition avec les pretendues " analyses " syndiquées des " mediats libres " des " democrassies occidentales "
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3 septembre 2017 7 03 /09 /septembre /2017 18:43

Le Vatican et la Russie négocieraient avec Cuba un plan de sortie de crise qui consisterait en une " déposition " de l' UBU Moustachien de Caracas Maduro , son exfiltration ainsi que celle des principales personnalités du régime comme Delcy Rodriguez et Tareck El Aissami  vers Cuba et la mise en place d'un régime qui continuerait les livraisons de pétrole à Cuba en attendant des élections générales .

Le Venezuela a été au centre des rencontres entre le cardinal Pietro Parolin , secrétaire d'état du Saint-Siège , et les représentants du pouvoir Russe à partir du 20 aout dernier .

Le Cardinal a d'autre part été au centre des efforts de la diplomatie Jésuite Vaticane dans la reprise des liens diplomatiques entre Cuba et

Sources : Presse Latino-Américaine

 

Tu quoque Putini : Le Vatican et la Russie négocieraient une sortie du dictateur Maduro vers Cuba .
Tu quoque Putini : Le Vatican et la Russie négocieraient une sortie du dictateur Maduro vers Cuba .
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8 juillet 2013 1 08 /07 /juillet /2013 17:08
    La réaction Bolivienne - la seule qui compte , l'économique - à l'outrage imposé par les chefs politiques Français au Président Bolivien Evo Morales commence à se manifester .
 Le ministre de la Défense Bolivien Rubén Saavedra vient d'annoncer l'achat d'hélicoptères Russes Mi-17 pour la lutte contre le trafic de drogue et des missions de défense civile . “Bolivia mostró interés en adquisición de helicópteros para transportar tropa para la lucha contra el narcotráfico (...) y tarefas de defensa civil”. [ lien ]  [ lien ]      [ lien ]    
 
      Si les négociations Russo-Boliviennes avaient été entamées dés 2011 , Eurocopter avait fait d'autres offres qui recueillaient l'aval du Président Bolivien et des chefs militaires Boliviens .[ lien ] [ lien ] Voici ce que disait le Président Evo Morales  lors de sa visite en France début mars 2013 [ lien ] [ lien ] :
" Ces hélicoptères - les hélicoptères Français NDLR- sont chaudement recommandés par les cadres de l'armée Bolivienne notamment en raison de leur capacité de voler en altitude et de faire des transports de troupe en grande nombre "
M. Morales a notamment évoqué leur utilité pour " repérer les plantations de coca sur les hauts plateaux boliviens difficilement atteignable" .  
 Mon analyse sur Pro-Russia TV  [ je l'ai écrite vendredi soir , avant l'annonce de l'achat des hélicoptères Russes par la Bolivie ] La décision Bolivienne  confirme que les achats d'armement comportent un aspect géostratégique au moins aussi important que les critères techniquesJPEG - 80.2 ko  :
 Bolivia compra helicópteros rusos para la lucha contra el narcotráfico
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8 juillet 2013 1 08 /07 /juillet /2013 15:17

C'est certainement l'une des meilleurs analyses sur le dossier Syrien . L'article original est sur le site de Ria-Novosti .[ lien vers article de Ria Novosti ]  Il reprend la thèse de la Russie comme " puissance de réassurance " et confirme que l'attitude des diplomaties Russes et Chinoises est scrupulusement observée en Amérique du Sud , en Afrique et en Asie .

 

Fin juin, le vice-premier ministre Syrien Qadri Jamil expliquait au Financial Times le mécanisme de survie de l'économie et de l'Etat syriens dans le contexte de guerre. Ces informations permettent de tirer quelques constats sur la nature du conflit syrien, écrit le quotidien Vedomosti du 8 juillet 2013. [ lien ]

Qadri Jamil a notamment indiqué que la Russie, la Chine et l'Iran mettaient en œuvre un programme d'aide à l'économie syrienne et fournissaient au pays tout le nécessaire pour poursuivre la guerre : des produits pétroliers, des aliments et des fonds financiers.

Les échanges avec ces pays s'effectuent avec leurs devises nationales, ce qui permet d'éviter d'éventuelles sanctions de la part des Etats-Unis. "L'appui des Russes, des Chinois et des Iraniens est toujours une bonne chose", affirme Qadri Jamil. 

Ces livraisons sont assurées par les navires Russes, ce qui explique la nécessité d'une présence continue de la marine russe près des côtes syriennes, aussi bien que le sens réel des déclarations des chefs militaires Russes concernant une présence permanente des bâtiments de guerre russes en Méditerranée. Les fournitures de pétrole, à elles seules, atteignent 500 millions de dollars par mois.

Si les actions de l'Iran dans le conflit syrien - ce dernier a octroyé à Damas un crédit illimité - sont tout à fait compréhensibles, l’attitude de la Russie et de la Chine pourrait révéler le début d'une nouvelle étape de leur coopération internationale.

Face à une nouvelle tentative américaine de faire chuter un régime ami, Moscou et Pékin n'ont aucune envie de se limiter comme jadis à des protestations à l'ONU. Ils ont mis en œuvre un programme coordonné à long terme – visiblement - visant à octroyer à la Syrie une aide économique, politique, militaire et technique. Le tout malgré une pression montante de la part des Etats-Unis. La Russie a donc envoyé ses navires vers la zone de conflit afin de garantir la réalisation de ce programme et il est possible que la Chine ait joué un rôle plus important dans les efforts économiques visant à épauler la Syrie. 

A l'heure actuelle, il semble que cette première tentative de confrontation ouverte avec l'Occident sur le territoire d'un pays tiers fonctionne. Les troupes de Bachar al-Assad ont en effet enregistré un certain nombre de succès militaires ces derniers temps. Et même si l'Etat Syrien chutait, sa résistance de deux ans démontrerait que la Russie et la Chine sont en mesure de soutenir de manière efficace leurs amis sous pression occidentale.

Si le gouvernement Syrien l’emportait, cela créerait une situation inédite : jusqu'à présent les capacités politiques et militaires des Etats-Unis ont toujours suffit pour isoler et écraser n'importe quel régime indésirable dans un pays du tiers-monde. Aujourd'hui l'exemple syrien témoigne du fait qu'un régime sous pression américaine pourrait compter sur une aide efficace.    

Mais pourquoi la Syrie est-elle le lieu de cette confrontation des intérêts occidentaux avec ceux de la Russie et de la Chine ? Moscou et Pékin considèrent probablement les actions américaines en Syrie comme une composante importante d'un plan stratégique de Washington, qu'il faut torpiller à tout prix.

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6 juillet 2013 6 06 /07 /juillet /2013 11:22

Le communiqué du MAE Français concernant le refus de survol du territoire Français par l'avion présidentiel Bolivien insulte notre intelligence et surtout l'intelligence des chefs d'état Latino-Américains . [ lien ]   

 1- L'avion du Président de la République Bolivien avait déposé un plan de vol avec tous les éléments nécessaires à son identification .

 2- Selon  Jean Paul Guevara, l’ambassadeur de Bolivie en France lors d’une conférence de presse. « Le permis de survol de la France avait été donné le 27 juin et a été retiré quand l’avion présidentiel était à quelques minutes de l’espace Français " Cela signifie que le contrôle aérien Français avait parfaitement la possibilité d'identifier l'aéronef au moyen par exemple de son transpondeur ADS-B [ lien ] [ lien ] comme étant FAB-001 c'est à dire l'avion présidentiel Bolivien . De simples amateurs ont pu ainsi reconstituer*  , et surtout suivre en temps réel [ lien ]  le vol de l'aéronef sur un radar virtuel . [ lien ]  [ lien vers page Flightradar24 de FAB-001 ]   

Il apparaît donc que , soit :

 

 1-Le contrôle aérien Français fonctionne au moyen de signaux optiques échangés entre le navigateur de l'avion et une équipe au sol comme il y a un siècle .

     

2- Le survol du territoire national par l'avion du Président Bolivien est traité comme un simple vol commercial . Il fut une époque ou la praxis diplomatique dans le cas d'un survol de notre territoire consistait en un échange de salutations et de voeux . La question est de savoir s'il s'agit aussi d'une pratique commune de la diplomatie Française  ou d'une discrimination vis à vis d un " état croupion " et son chef rastaquouère !

     

3- Le gouvernement Français a agi sur des informations erronées de ses barbouzes  infiltrées dans l'aéroport de Cheremetievo .

 

  4-  Le gouvernement Français a agi sur des informations ou sur une injonction en provenance de l'ambassade des Etats-Unis , c'est à dire que Laurent Fabius est une carpette doublée d'un menteur .

 

 

 

* Q - À la lecture de cette situation, d'après le président de la république, il y avait peut-être deux avions, puis un, et dès que le président de la république a su qu'il transportait M. Morales, il a donné immédiatement l'ordre de laisser passer cet avion.

R- C'est exact. Le président l'a dit lui-même. [ lien ] (Screenshot of FlightRadar24.com)

 

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3 juillet 2013 3 03 /07 /juillet /2013 20:18

 

 

 

Quelque soient les dénégations que feront les chefs politiques Français , et en particulier l'ignominie  en costume qui usurpe  la fonction de Président de la République [ lien ]  , le refus de survol du territoire Français par l'avion de la Présidence de la République de l'état plurinational de Bolivie relève de la piraterie aérienne d'état . [ article du site Slate.fr ]

La Convention de Vienne sur les relations diplomatiques, signée en 1961, détaille les principes de l’immunité dont jouissent les chefs de mission diplomatique, la plupart du temps les ambassadeurs, et les membres d’une mission diplomatique.

Ce texte, ratifié par 189 pays, précise notamment qu’un Etat qui accueille un diplomate étranger doit, sauf en cas de menace pour la sécurité nationale, lui assurer la liberté de déplacement et de circulation sur son territoire. Si cette obligation ne concerne que les chefs et membres de missions diplomatiques, il est généralement accepté que l’immunité qui leur est garantie en tant que représentants de leur Etat s’applique aussi aux chefs d’Etat, qui sont de facto à la tête de la diplomatie de leur pays .

Quelque soit notre positionnement par rapport aux événements survenus en Algérie entre 1954 et 1962 , les chefs politique Français viennent de commettre un acte de piraterie aérienne comparable à celui commis lors de l'arraisonnement de l'avion de Ben-Bella en 1956. [ lien ]  .

Cette décision d'interdire le survol de notre territoire confirme l'alignement Atlantiste des chefs politiques Français [ lien vers article ] , mais aussi Italiens , Espagnols et Portugais .

En effet la question essentielle à se poser est : Sur quels éléments de preuve les chefs politiques Français ont pris la décision d'interdire le survol du territoire national par l'avion présidentiel Bolivien ?  

Au delà du soutien très vague affiché par le Président Evo Morales à l'égard d'Edward Snowden , on imagine mal une barbouze Française dans le hall de transit de l'aéroport de Cheremetievo ou un contact parmi le personnel technique de l'aéroport qui aurait pu renseigner les décideurs Français  . Les autorités Françaises [ Espagnoles , Italiennes , Portugaises ] n'ont donc pu avoir  pour éléments de prise de décision que des renseignements en provenance d'une source Etasunienne .

 Liens : La milice indigène Aymara des " Ponchos Rouges " devant l'ambassade de France à La Paz http://www.demotiximages.com/node/2221205                      

 Le communiqué vipérin de la Présidente Dilma Rousseff

http://blog.planalto.gov.br/em-nota-governo-expressa-repudio-ao-constrangimento-imposto-ao-presidente-evo-morales/Des Boliviens placardent des textes protestataires sur les murs de l'ambassade de France à La Paz, le 3 juillet 2013.ben bella au Maroc

 

O presidente boliviano, Evo Morales, embarca em seu avião após finalmente ser liberado para deixar a Áustria Foto: AP

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2 septembre 2011 5 02 /09 /septembre /2011 19:39

05PARIS579

2005-01-31 15:19 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Paris

 

 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV FR RU
SUBJECT: FRENCH "EXPLAIN AND REASSURE" ON TRIP TO RUSSIA


Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS

ONS 1.4 B/D 

1. (C) Summary: Foreign Minister Barnier and Defense Minister
Alliot-Marie visited Russia January 20-21 for bi-annual
security consultations with their counterparts.  The
consultations drew higher-than-expected visibility from the
French press, although an MFA contact told us that the
meetings followed a standard format and did not result in
breakthroughs on either side.  The Russians complained about
relations with the EU, but seemed more open to discussing
Chechnya.  The French were concerned by what they considered
a "tougher" line by the Russians regarding the frozen
conflicts in Moldova and Georgia.  Given what they saw as
firm Russian rejection of the OSCE's Border Monitoring
Operation (BMO) in Georgia, they urged U.S.-EU discussion and
agreement on how to respond to Russian concerns while still
keeping some BMO capacity.  French officials were impressed
with Defense Minister Ivanov, and consider him to be a
potential successor to President Putin.  End summary

 

And the winner is ............. PIERRE COCHARD !

 

 

On January 27, Poloff met with MFA DAS-equivalent for
Russia and the former Soviet space Pierre Cochard to discuss
the January 20-21 visit by FM Barnier and MOD Alliot-Marie to
Russia.

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31 janvier 2011 1 31 /01 /janvier /2011 00:45

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 002572 SIPDIS FOR NEA/ELA, R, S/P

AND H NSC FOR PASCUAL AND KUTCHA-HELBLING E.O. 12958: DECL:

12/30/2028 TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, EG SUBJECT: APRIL 6 ACTIVIST ON HIS

U.S. VISIT AND REGIME CHANGE IN EGYPT REF: A. CAIRO 2462 B.

CAIRO 2454 C. CAIRO 2431 Classified By: ECPO A/Mincouns

Catherine Hill-Herndon for reason 1.4 (d ). 1. (C) Summary and

comment: On December 23, April 6 activist xxxxxxxxxxxx expressed

satisfaction with his participation in the December 3-5 \"Alliance of

Youth Movements Summit,\" and with his subsequent meetings with USG

officials, on Capitol Hill, and with think tanks. He described how

State Security (SSIS) detained him at the Cairo airport upon his

return and confiscated his notes for his summit presentation calling

for democratic change in Egypt, and his schedule for his Congressional

meetings. xxxxxxxxxxxx contended that the GOE will never undertake

significant reform, and therefore, Egyptians need to replace the

current regime with a parliamentary democracy. He alleged that

several opposition parties and movements have accepted an unwritten

plan for democratic transition by 2011; we are doubtful of this claim.

xxxxxxxxxxxx said that although SSIS recently released two April 6

activists, it also arrested three additional group members. We have

pressed the MFA for the release of these April 6 activists. April 6's

stated goal of replacing the current regime with a parliamentary

democracy prior to the 2011 presidential elections is highly

unrealistic, and is not supported by the mainstream opposition. End

summary and comment. ---------------------------- Satisfaction with

the Summit ---------------------------- 2. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx expressed

satisfaction with the December 3-5 \"Alliance of Youth Movements

Summit\" in New York, noting that he was able to meet activists from

other countries and outline his movement's goals for democratic change

in Egypt. He told us that the other activists at the summit were very

supportive, and that some even offered to hold public demonstrations

in support of Egyptian democracy in their countries, with xxxxxxxxxxxx

as an invited guest. xxxxxxxxxxxx said he discussed with the other

activists how April 6 members could more effectively evade harassment

and surveillance from SSIS with technical upgrades, such as

consistently alternating computer \"simcards.\" However, xxxxxxxxxxxx

lamented to us that because most April 6 members do not own computers,

this tactic would be impossible to implement. xxxxxxxxxxxx was

appreciative of the successful efforts by the Department and the

summit organizers to protect his identity at the summit, and told us

that his name was never mentioned publicly. ------------------- A

Cold Welcome Home ------------------- 3. (S) xxxxxxxxxxxx told us

that SSIS detained and searched him at the Cairo Airport on December

18 upon his return from the U.S. According to xxxxxxxxxxxx, SSIS

found and confiscated two documents in his luggage: notes for his

presentation at the summit that described April 6's demands for

democratic transition in Egypt, and a schedule of his Capitol Hill

meetings. xxxxxxxxxxxx described how the SSIS officer told him that

State Security is compiling a file on him, and that the officer's

superiors instructed him to file a report on xxxxxxxxxxxx most recent

activities. --------------------------------------------- ----------

Washington Meetings and April 6 Ideas for Regime Change

--------------------------------------------- ---------- 4. (C)

xxxxxxxxxxxx described his Washington appointments as positive, saying

that on the Hill he met with xxxxxxxxxxxx, a variety of House staff

members, including from the offices of xxxxxxxxxxxx and xxxxxxxxxxxx),

and with two Senate staffers. xxxxxxxxxxxx also noted that he met

with several think tank members. xxxxxxxxxxxx said that xxxxxxxxxxxx's

office invited him to speak at a late January Congressional hearing on

House Resolution 1303 regarding religious and political freedom in

Egypt. xxxxxxxxxxxx told us he is interested in attending, but

conceded he is unsure whether he will have the funds to make the trip.

He indicated to us that he has not been focusing on his work as a

\"fixer\" for journalists, due to his preoccupation with his U.S.

trip. 5. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx described how he tried to convince his

Washington interlocutors that the USG should pressure the GOE to

implement significant reforms by threatening to reveal CAIRO 00002572

002 OF 002 information about GOE officials' alleged \"illegal\"

off-shore bank accounts. He hoped that the U.S. and the international

community would freeze these bank accounts, like the accounts of

Zimbabwean President Mugabe's confidantes. xxxxxxxxxxxx said he wants

to convince the USG that Mubarak is worse than Mugabe and that the GOE

will never accept democratic reform. xxxxxxxxxxxx asserted that

Mubarak derives his legitimacy from U.S. support, and therefore

charged the U.S. with \"being responsible\" for Mubarak's \"crimes.\"

He accused NGOs working on political and economic reform of living in

a \"fantasy world,\" and not recognizing that Mubarak -- \"the head of

the snake\" -- must step aside to enable democracy to take root. 6.

(C) xxxxxxxxxxxx claimed that several opposition forces -- including

the Wafd, Nasserite, Karama and Tagammu parties, and the Muslim

Brotherhood, Kifaya, and Revolutionary Socialist movements -- have

agreed to support an unwritten plan for a transition to a

parliamentary democracy, involving a weakened presidency and an

empowered prime minister and parliament, before the scheduled 2011

presidential elections (ref C). According to xxxxxxxxxxxx, the

opposition is interested in receiving support from the army and the

police for a transitional government prior to the 2011 elections.

xxxxxxxxxxxx asserted that this plan is so sensitive it cannot be

written down. (Comment: We have no information to corroborate that

these parties and movements have agreed to the unrealistic plan

xxxxxxxxxxxx has outlined. Per ref C, xxxxxxxxxxxx previously told us

that this plan was publicly available on the internet. End comment.)

7. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx said that the GOE has recently been cracking down

on the April 6 movement by arresting its members. xxxxxxxxxxxx noted

that although SSIS had released xxxxxxxxxxxx and xxxxxxxxxxxx \"in the

past few days,\" it had arrested three other members. (Note: On

December 14, we pressed the MFA for the release of xxxxxxxxxxxx and

xxxxxxxxxxxx, and on December 28 we asked the MFA for the GOE to

release the additional three activists. End note.) xxxxxxxxxxxx

conceded that April 6 has no feasible plans for future activities.

The group would like to call for another strike on April 6, 2009, but

realizes this would be \"impossible\" due to SSIS interference,

xxxxxxxxxxxx said. He lamented that the GOE has driven the group's

leadership underground, and that one of its leaders, xxxxxxxxxxxx, has

been in hiding for the past week. 8. (C) Comment: xxxxxxxxxxxx

offered no roadmap of concrete steps toward April 6's highly

unrealistic goal of replacing the current regime with a parliamentary

democracy prior to the 2011 presidential elections. Most opposition

parties and independent NGOs work toward achieving tangible,

incremental reform within the current political context, even if they

may be pessimistic about their chances of success. xxxxxxxxxxxx

wholesale rejection of such an approach places him outside this

mainstream of opposition politicians and activists.

SCOBEY02008-12-307386PGOV,PHUM,KDEM,EGAPRIL 6 ACTIVIST ON HIS U.S.

VISIT AND REGIME CHANGE IN EGYPT

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23 janvier 2011 7 23 /01 /janvier /2011 12:56

La publication lors de la première quinzaine de janvier de télègrammes diplomatiques en provenance des ambassades d'Oslo et de Reykkjavik permet d'apréhender les préoccupations de la diplomatie Etasunienne concernant l' Arctique .

Le premier des télègrammes étudié sera le câble 09OSLO146 envoyé le 6 mars 2009 parl l'amabassade d'Oslo et concernant le projet d'une alliance politico-militaire Scandinave telle qu'elle est proposée par le rapport Stoltenberg .[ 1 ]

Le seul titre du télègramme , " Un rêve dans les brumes polaires " laisse suggérer que la diplomatie Etasunienne ne pense pas à une opérationalisation concrête de ce projet à une échéance rapprochée mais reconnaît  que ce pacte pourrait permettre aux EU et à l'OTAN de renforcer leurs capacités dans certains domaines dans l'espace Arctique tout en permettant d'influencer les politiques de défense Scandinaves .

 

Le " pacte de solidarité " - équivalent de l'Article 5 de la charte de l'OTAN - que prévoit le projet de l'ancien MAE Norvégien Thorvald Stoltenberg et qui viendarit s'ajouter à l'orientation Atlantiste de la Norvège - ce qui explique sa présence dans le projet de Stoltenberg - pourrait entrer en collision avec la politique de neutralité de la Suède et de la Finlande et même avec l'orientation Atlantiste de la Norvège . Plusieurs responsables politiques Norvégiens ont par ailleurs confié en privé aux diplomates Etasuniens que le gouvernement Norvégien ne voit pas l'intêret d'un pacte de solidarité .

 

Le télègramme met en avant le caractère maritime - et dirigé contre la Russie - du pacte et en particulier celui de la surveillance maritime des régions circumpolaires et de l'espace Baltique au travers de trois dispostifs :

- Un systéme de surveillance maritime Nordique

- Une force de recherche et de sauvetage et pour les " autres urgences " ( !)  

- Un système satellitaire de surveillance et de communications .

 

Le rapport met en avant le manque de capacités en brise-glaces à capacités arctiques de la Norvège , du Danemark ( Groënland ) et de l'Islande . Il souligne aussi l'intêret [ pour les EU ] du système de surveillance satellitaire qui permetterait de contrôler et sécuriser  l'ensemble des communications maritimes de l'Alliance dans  la région "en cas de crise ".

 

 

Le rédacteur du télègramme emet la recommandation d'encourager les états Scandinaves à aller de l'avant dans ce projet d'alliance et - qui en douterait ? -  de développer les points qui rentrent dans le cadre des priorités de l'OTAN et des EU [ ce sont les mêmes ! ] :

Surveillance de la Mer de Barents , augmentaion des capacités militaires dans la région Arctique sur les bourses des Scandinaves ,..

 

La lecture de ce télégramme justifie  la politique Russe d'augmentation des capacités navales de la Russie dans cette région avec en particulier l'affectation d'un BPC de la classe Mistral à la Flotte du Nord .

 

  Lien original : http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/03/09OSLO146.html

 

    Lire aussi : L'OTAN du Nord: surveiller les ours et les Russes? par Ilya Kramnik

 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OSLO 000146 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2019 TAGS:  
 PNRPGOVPRELMARRMCAPMOPSDAICFISW SUBJECT: DREAMS IN POLAR FOG: PROPOSED NORDIC EFENSE AND SECURITY COOPERATION REF: 08 OSLO 54 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Kevin . Johnson for reasons 1.4 b and d 1.(C) Summay: Challenged to re-invigorate Nordic cooperation, former Norwegian Foreign Minister (and father of PM Jens Stoltenberg) Thorvald Stoltenberg presented 13 recommendations proposing greater civil and military cooperation and a Nordic version of NATO's Article Five. Stoltenberg delivered his wide-ranging (and non-binding) recommendations at the February 9 meeting of the Nordic Foreign Ministers. Norway's current FM, Jonas Gahr Stoere, hailed the report as historic and modern. Reactions from other Norwegian policy-makers has been less enthusiastic, but several of the recommendations have potential to increase Nordic capabilities and cooperation in international operations, a plus for the UN and NATO. In addition, the U.S. could propose specific areas where we see Nordic cooperation contributing to NATO or U.S. priorities. End Summary. A Nordic Article Five? --------------------- 2.(C) The most attention-grabbing of Stoltenberg's ideas was his call for a Nordic declaration of solidarity, including a mutually binding security policy guarantee. In his introductory press conference, Stoltenberg stressed that this proposal was not designed to take the place of existing treaty commitments, but should be viewed as something additional. Nonetheless, this idea was seen by some as a potential challenge to Swedish and Finnish neutrality and to Norway's traditional transatlantic orientation. Reaction in Norway has been largely dismissive of the idea but it is easy to see echoes of a call by the Norwegian Socialist Left Party's defense spokesman for a division of labor in the Nordics with Finland responsible for a joint army, Sweden for the air force and Norway for the navy. Senior Norwegian officials including the PM's foreign policy advisor and the MFA's political director have privately indicated to us that there is little or no interest in a Nordic solidarity declaration in the GON.  Saving Money and Sharing Responsibilities ----------------------------------------- 3.(U) Declining defense budgets across the Nordic region have already inspired the Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) of Norway, Sweden and Finland to conduct a study on areas of possible cooperation. Stoltenberg expands on the CHODs' study, proposing joint medical units, transport and lift capability (both air and sea), cooperation in training and education (including firing and exercise ranges) and joint equipment upgrades and purchases. Stoltenberg singled out army material as particularly promising citing the common use of all Nordics (with the exception of non-military Iceland) of Leopard 2 battle tanks, CV-90 combat vehicles and Sisu Pasi armored personnel carriers. Stoltenberg also proposed developing a joint amphibious unit, based on current cooperation between Sweden and Finland, which could be deployed anywhere in the Nordics and in international operations. 4.(C) Lest Iceland feel neglected, Stoltenberg proposed that the Nordics take on part of the responsibility for air surveillance and patrolling over Iceland. Initially this would be through participation in the regular Northern Viking exercises, followed by rotations in the NATO air patrol rotations and a possible permanent presence at Keflavik air base. Norway and Denmark already participate in the NATO program. Swedish and Finnish participation would require finalization of an agreement between NATO and Sweden and Finland on data exchange with NATO's air defense system. In theory this sort of cooperation could be a practical example of cooperation under the Partnership for Peace program. Surprisingly, Norwegian officials have been very critical of this proposal, with the MFA's Political Director and the PM's International Advisor both expressing strong dislike for this item. OSLO 00000146 002 OF 003 Keeping an eye on Polar Bears and Russians ------------------------------------------  5.(U) Maritime monitoring is a central focus of the report with three separate but interrelated recommendations. These include establishing a Nordic maritime monitoring system, a joint maritime response force, and a joint satellite system for surveillance and communications. The monitoring system and the satellite proposal all reflect the need for improvements in the ability to monitor civilian and military shipping, environmental data and pollution. This need will increase if shipping volume in the region increases due to sea ice melting or development of energy projects such as the Shtockman field. Norway is in the process of developing a civilian-military Barents Sea monitoring system called Barents Watch, and Sweden and Finland are currently expanding their joint defense surveillance system to the entire Baltic Sea. Stoltenberg calls for a joint Nordic effort to ensure that national efforts are combatable and do not replicate functions. A joint satellite would allow for complete and constant monitoring of the entire Nordic region, as well as enabling secure communications in the event of a crisis. Currently the Nordic nations purchase satellite services from U.S. and European suppliers which do not provide satisfactory coverage above 71 degrees north. Once a monitoring system is in place there will be a need for a response capability for search and rescue and other emergencies. This capability should include icebreakers fit for Arctic use.  Although Baltic capabilities are strong, there are not currently enough resources to cover the vast sea areas under Norwegian, Danish (Greenland) and Icelandic control, particularly if shipping in the area increases. Addressing 21st Century Challenges ---------------------------------- 6.(U) Stoltenberg also proposed a number of ideas which would increase civil cooperation including a Nordic stabilization task force, a joint disaster response unit, a Nordic resource network to protect against cyber attacks, a war crimes investigation unit, cooperation between foreign services, and on Arctic issues. The need for cooperation in war crimes prosecution, protection of infrastructure from cyber attack and on Arctic issues is clear and relatively non-controversial. Cooperation between foreign services is much more difficult and will likely be limited to countries where none of the Nordics have representation now. 7.(U) As envisioned, the Nordic stabilization task force would consist of military, humanitarian, state-building (police officers, judges, prison officers, election observers) and development assistance components. This unit would be intended for use in UN-led operations and for NATO, EU, AU or OSCE missions with a UN mandate. Stoltenberg proposes that the military forces allocated to this unit be drawn from those currently available for the EU Nordic Battle Group and the NATO Response Force. Dreams or Reality? ----------------- 8.(C) Comment: High defense costs, a genuine preference to work with other Nordics and clear regional needs are real factors which inspired the Stoltenberg study and which may result in some of his recommendations being followed. The Nordic Ministers will meet next on June 9 in Iceland and will announce which recommendations will be pursued. GON officials have uniformly stressed that where money can be saved and capabilities increased they are positive. They were much less positive about the grander ambitions, such as the Nordic solidarity declaration and taking over responsibility for Iceland's air patrols. Where this study could result in something of value is primarily in any increase in military, international operations and surveillance capacity. Joint Nordic transport capabilities, medical teams, amphibious units, a stabilization task force and maritime awareness could be important contributions to UN, NATO or U.S. missions. ¶9. (C) The U.S. should encourage Nordic cooperation to the OSLO 00000146 003 OF 003 extent that it increases the Nordics' willingness and ability to improve their internal and international capabilities to deal with global challenges. It may also be of benefit to propose specific issues where we see Nordic cooperation contributing to NATO or U.S. priorities, such as maritime monitoring of the Barents, the development of stabilization teams, increases in military capacity, prosecution of war criminals, etc. WHITNEY 

 

Articles associés :

[ 1 ] Géopolitique de l'Arctique et de la Baltique : Vesrs une alliance politico-militaire Scandinave .

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13 décembre 2010 1 13 /12 /décembre /2010 19:40

Je vous livre dans cette analyse , un extrait d'un télégramme d'une entrevue entre le sous-secrétaire Wiliam Burns et un " petit fonctionnaire " du Quai d'Orsay . Pourquoi " petit " , par ce que même conseiller Politique de M.Bernard Kouchner , il est plus que probable que M.Gérard Araud n'atteindra jamais la renommée de MM. Paul Morand , " Saint John Perse " , Edouard Grenier ou Jean Giraudoux et finira comme on écrit dans les " poubelles de l'histoire " !

M. Gérard Arnaud se livre à l" analyse " suivante : La conduite de la diplomatie Russe est antisémite au simple fait qu'un député Russe ait fait allusion à la judaïté de M.Sarkozy ! ...

Mais il est vrai que M.Araud a été " sensibilisé " à la question de l'" antisémitisme " puisqu'il est ancien ambassadeur de France dans l'" Etat Juif " comme ce dernier aime à se définir .*

Avec M.Araud , on s'attend à  voir surgir au détour d'une discussion une sotnyia de cosaques en uniformes noirs et cartouchières sur le torse - les centuries noires - à cheval incendiant un schetl  du côté de Mogilev ou Gomel , pourchassant avec leur lances un brave rabbi barbu et violant de jeunes filles en fichu " blanc-bleu " ! ... [ voir caricature ] .

 

On peut troutefois créditer M. Gérard Araud de " réalisme " géopolitique : La Géorgie devrait avoir la politique étrangère de sa géographie , et il cite pour exemple la Finlande !

 

Télégramme PARIS 002743 du 26 juin 2007 .

 

Russia, Missile Defense and CFE
-------------------------------

¶8. (C) Echoing almost verbatim his previous comments to
visiting staffdel Myers (ref B), Araud stated that Russia has
become a problem as it regresses to a traditional Czarist
foreign policy -- imperialist and brutal, reflecting endemic
racism, anti-Semitism and nationalism. By way of an example,
he noted that a high-ranking member of the Duma recently
exclaimed to a visiting French official, "so, you've elected
the Jew Sarkozy!" Araud also observed that Russia feels
besieged by NATO, the U.S. and the West. Faced with the
"trauma" of dealing with Chechnya, and the "humiliation" of
retreat from former territories during the Yeltsin years,
Russia is unlikely to modify its imperialist foreign policy
in the near future. Our collective challenge, emphasized
Araud, is to find a middle way "between complacency and
confrontation" in dealing with Putin and this "new Russia."

Georgia
-------

¶12. (C) Turning to the then-upcoming June 13 Sarkozy meeting
with Georgian President Saakashvili, Loras commented that the
Presidents had met twice before. In public, Loras added,
France will convey a message of "strong support." Privately,
however, the French planned to urge Sakaashvili not to
provoke the Russians, to avoid raising tensions, and to work
on the human rights situation in Georgia. The Georgians are
looking to use NATO as a shield; they "should not play with
fire" by baiting Moscow, Loras emphasized. Burns said the
USG also had counseled Sakaashvili against provoking the
Russians, but Sakaashvili will be nervous until Georgia has
obtained MAP. Burns explained that the U.S. had told the
Georgian President that while NATO's door remains open,
Georgia must meet its obligations under NATO.

¶13. (C) Voicing well-known French reservations over NATO
membership for Georgia, Araud questioned whether membership
ultimately made sense: "Georgia in NATO means problems; it
should have the diplomacy of its geography." He pointed to
Finland -- a prosperous and independent non-NATO country on
Russia's border -- as a possible model. Presidential advisor
Richier added that decisions on the borders of Europe for the
EU and NATO were open. Is Georgia-in-NATO a security
interest? Araud concluded by stating that Sarkozy has not
yet addressed Georgia policy. Burns explained that the USG
would like to see Georgia obtain MAP status and eventual NATO
membership. We clearly have a different view of NATO: we
see a political imperative in bringing in democracies. The
same logic that brought the Baltics into NATO applies to
Georgia. Russian objections should not block the membership
track; Moscow should not have a veto. The future of Russia
is not readily predictable, hence the U.S. would like to
ensure that as much of Europe is democratic and protected by
NATO as possible
.

 

Biographie de M. Gérard Araud -- surnommé« Condoleezza » au Quai - d'aprés Wikipedia :


Gérard Araud   est né à Marseille le 20 février 1953. Il est ancien élève de l'École polytechnique et diplômé de l’École nationale d'administration. Il est premier secrétaire de 1987 à 1989 puis deuxième conseiller de 1989 à 1991 à l'Ambassade de France à Washington. Il est représentant permanent adjoint à la France à l'Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique Nord à Bruxelles de 1995 à 2000. Il est ambassadeur de France en Israël à Tel Aviv de 2003 à 2006. En septembre 2006 il est nommé secrétaire général adjoint et directeur générale des affaires politiques et de sécurité au Ministère des Affaires étrangères.
Voici qu'il declarait en quittant son poste de Tel-Aviv :" Et vous, français d’Israël, vous avez fait le choix légitime du sionisme " !

  Lien : Les Néo-cons d’Orsay 

 

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10 décembre 2010 5 10 /12 /décembre /2010 16:22

Dans un télégramme consacré à la " danse du ventre " de la diplomatie Etasunienne devant les minorités Françaises et plus particulièrement devant la communauté musulmane Française , j'ai relevé quelques éléments sur la stratégie de pénétration de la diplomatie Etasunienne des media Français .

Si ce télégramme décrit et critique de manière lucide la structure capitalistique et l'esprit de caste des journalistes Français - cette " écume des vagues " que j'évoquais dans un autre article et qui est développée  dans les media Français à propos de ce télégramme - c'est bien la stratégie de pénétration des media Français qui mérite d'être retenue comme l'élèment le plus intéressant . Il faut en particulier desormais mettre un nom sur ces " USG surrogates " qui interviennent dans les media Français . Le télégramme révéle aussi que dans cette volonté de comunautariser la France ,et dans l'objectif  de " mettre du rouge à lévres sur un porc" cad de présenter les Etats-Unis sous un aspect amical ,  la diplomatie Etasunienne compte sur le soutien de ... l'Education Nationale ainsi que d'ONG financées par le Département d'Etat .

Le télégramme  donne les adresses mel des responsables de la startégie Etasunienne vis à vis des minorités en France .

Il faut ici signaler que selon la législation Brésilienne , les ONG recevant des fonds de la part d'une ambassade étrangère devraient les déclarer aux services fiscaux ainsi qu'au public .

On comprend pourquoi de tels dispositifs législatifs sont combattus par le gouvernement Etasunien partout à travers le monde au nom de la " démocratie " .

Cette déclaration concerne les particuliers aux Etats Unis : C'est le Foreign Agent Registration Act que j'ai évoqué sur ce blogue à propos de l'affaire d'espionnage qui a éclaté aux Etats-Unis l'été dernier . Comme je l'ai écrit à l'époque , et concernant justement cet activisme Etasunien au sein des minorités Françaises , il grand temps que le législateur Français développe un projet de loi similaire en France : La pénetration  de notre haute adminstration , de la Justice , des Douanes ne rend que plus urgent une telle législation .

Ce télégramme devrait en tout cas inciter Bercy à mener des enquêtes fiscales sérieuses parmi ces associations " non - gouvernementales " .

Concernant l'Education Nationale , si le télégramme fait clairement allusion  aux responsables ministériels * , il convient desormais de s'interroger si la pénétration des envoyés de l'Ambassade Etasunienne -  minority engagement officers -  - a atteint les rectorats , le corps des inspecteurs et le corps professoral et quels sont les " activités pédagogiques " qui ont été développées en collaboration avec le Departement d'Etat .

C'est une responsabilité des syndicats de l'Education Nationale de demander des explications écrites au Ministère sur ce sujet .

Ice Station Zebra publiera de manière anonyme tous les témoignages .

* Compte tenu de la date du télégramme et du début de la stratégie de penetration des minorités qui remonte à 2003 il peut s'agir de MM. Luc Ferry , François Fillon ou Gilles de Robien et plus probablement du dernier M. Gilles de Robien .

 

 

Télégramme 07PARIS306 du 25 janvier 2007 .

 

 UNCLAS PARIS 000306 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS For EUR/PGI (Weinstein), EUR/PPD (Davis) E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OPRC PREL PHUM KPAO KISL FR XG SUBJECT: ENGAGEMENT WITH MUSLIM COMMUNITIES - FRANCE REF: 06 STATE 185834 Sensitive but unclassified - entire text. Please protect accordingly. ¶1. Summary: The Ambassador and all of Mission France support a sustained and focused effort to engage France's Muslim minorities, recognizing that organizing and executing such an effort will continue to require considerable discretion, sensitivity and tact on our part. Although there is some evidence that France's Muslim minorities are better integrated than their counterparts elsewhere in Europe, the French have a well-known problem with discrimination against minorities. French media has fallen short in their reporting on these issues and French government and private institutions also found it difficult to face up squarely to the challenges involved. We can engage the French both privately and via the media on the issue of minority inclusion, but superior French language skills are crucial to make effective use of the French broadcast media. Â2. Our specific goals for this strategy: a) demonstration of our commitment to these issues, b) sharing of our American experiences in managing diversity, and c) encouraging social reforms within France to improve the lot of its minorities. ¶3. Post will continue to grow its established minority outreach effort, identifying Arab-Muslim outreach projects as such in expanded program reporting. Effectiveness will be measured in terms of audience and participant totals, improved French media treatment of minority issues, a measurably improved perception of the U.S. among target audiences, and the initiation of new policies and programs by both the French government and French non-governmental organizations to improve the lot of French Arabs and Muslims. ¶4. Contact information for post's designated minority engagement officers - PDOff Colombia Barrosse and PolOff William Stephen Wells - is in the last paragraph. End summary. ------------- The Challenge ------------- ¶5. Reftel tasked post to produce a '07 - '08 public outreach strategy for engaging France's Muslim minorities, to counter terrorist recruiting among them, and to foster their greater integration into mainstream French society. We regret the late response to this tasking. ¶6. Embassy Paris and its seven field posts began to reach out systematically to France's Arab and Muslim populations several years ago, in 2003, targeting neighborhoods and institutions known to have large immigrant populations (first, second and third generation.) Since that time post established a broad base of political reporting on French Muslim issues, and the post's Public Affairs Section increasingly focused its program assets (speakers, DVCs, exhibits, exchanges and grants) on minority communities, under the more acceptable rubric of "civil society" outreach. ¶7. Organizing and executing this outreach required sensitivity and discretion due to France's particular philosophical outlook and history. It has the largest Muslim minority population in Western Europe, both as an absolute number and as a percentage of the national population. France's five million plus Muslims are largely North African (Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian) in origin, although they remain diverse and resistant to blanket categorization. The French Government's approach to religion and minorities traditionally has been to promote assimilation under the banner of equality, however imperfectly that goal has been achieved, with a strong emphasis on "laicite" (secularism) in public spaces. This policy demands official blindness to all racial and ethnic differences. French law formally prohibits the collection of statistics on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic background; and only approximate figures are available to us regarding France's minorities, including Muslims. ¶8. Concepts such as "affirmative action," "diversity," "multiculturalism," or compound descriptions of identity (e.g. Arab-American) are relatively new and somewhat controversial in France, where the approach has been more to target specific geographic enclaves, e.g. educational programs for neighborhoods with a high percentage of socio-economically disadvantaged (often Arab and Muslim) youth. ¶9. Young French citizens across the religious spectrum tend not to be practicing/devout, but disadvantaged minority youth remain an obvious target for extremist recruiting. As a result of recent events (including the November 2005 unrest in the suburbs), diversity and integration are discussed more openly - at conferences, as well as on talk shows and campuses. Nevertheless, it remains generally indelicate in France to ask a person's religious affiliation. Challenging the government's approach to assimilation can amount to challenging the basis of French identity within the Republic. ¶10. The organization and execution of any official USG Muslim outreach strategy in such an environment - whatever the strong justification in our eyes - will continue to require considerable and continuing discretion, sensitivity and tact. ----------------- Media Environment ----------------- ¶11. As in other European countries, French media reporting of U.S. policies and intentions is often skeptical. Reporting by the mainstream media on Arab Muslims and their issues, however, is typically not so much negative as negligent, falling short both in its coverage of discrimination towards them and of juvenile delinquency among them. ¶12.  
 Official Americans and pro-USG surrogates have ready access to most French media to convey official policy messages,but using that access effectively presents a special challenge. Superior French language and presentation skills are especially important for making effective use of French broadcast media. Communicating to the French about the treatment of their minorities, a topic they themselves are often reticent to explore in depth, is more difficult for us than, say, describing our own, American experience. Any ill-prepared efforts to reach out to France's Muslim audiences could easily become counter-productive. We therefore must continue to proceed with care. ¶13. Our primary media focus needs to be on TV and radio, but print - and the new media - should not be ignored. Â14. Fewer or less than one French adult in four reads a national newspaper regularly. Regional papers are still important, however, with Ouest France (Rennes) being the largest daily. The French are more avid magazine readers, buying over three billion copies a year. Â15. French broadcasting is partly state-owned and partly in the hands of private enterprise. Most French TV viewers still, reportedly, prefer the six major broadcast channels, but the number of channels offered by various cable and satellite operators continues to grow, with the newest being France 24, a CNN-like 24-hour news-station. Average French TV viewership is over five and one-half hours per day. ¶16. Radio, especially FM, remains an important medium in France: over 99 per cent of French households own at least one radio and almost 5 in 6 over the age of 13 year listen to the radio daily. As with TV, French radio is part state-owned and part private. ¶17. Top French journalists are often products of the same elite schools as many French government leaders. These journalists do not necessarily regard their primary role as to check the power of government. Rather, many see themselves more as intellectuals, preferring to analyze events and influence readers more than to report events. ¶18. The private sector media in France - print and broadcast - continues to be dominated by a small number of conglomerates, and all French media are more regulated and subjected to political and commercial pressures than are their American counterparts. The Higher Audio-Visual Council, created in 1989, appoints the CEOs of all French public broadcasting channels and monitors their political content. ¶19. Internet access is growing steadily in France, especially among the younger generation, rapidly replacing traditional media. All important television and radio channels in France have their own websites, as do the major print media. Blogs are an increasingly popular method of communication for minorities and NGOs, who use them to express opinions they do not feel are reflected in the traditional media. ¶20. France's first generation Arab immigrants typically continue to read publications from their countries of origin, and the major Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian papers are widely available in larger French cities. These individuals also watch satellite and cable TV stations in Arabic, including Al-Jazeerah TV. Second and third generation French Arabs, however, are typically not literate in Arab, and their print media habits are similar to those of other French readers. -------------- Specific Goals -------------- ¶21. DEMONSTRATE OUR COMMITMENT. We need to say and show, repeatedly, to Muslim and non-Muslim audiences alike, the USG is engaged for good in the Arab-Muslim world, we respect Islam, and the USG takes seriously the potentially global threat of disenfranchised and disadvantaged minorities in France. For those reasons, and because we believe in participatory democracy, we promote the advancement and full integration of France's minorities into mainstream society. ¶22. SHARE OUR EXPERIENCES. We also must continue to communicate, well and often, to both Muslim and non-Muslim audiences in France, the American experience with ethnic and social conflict - both our successes and our failures - in order to establish our legitimacy for engagement on this issue. We can strengthen the sense of shared values and common cause between Americans and French working for inter-communal cooperation, peace, stability, opportunity and respect. In addition, we need to remain present, listening and showing respect for French (immigrant and non-immigrant) experiences. ¶23. Most French minorities, including Arabs, are somewhat aware of the U.S. experience and positively inclined towards us, seeing us as having tried to address our shortcomings. What many French lack is specific information about or any in-depth understanding of our experience that might help them to conceive of and implement a workable French model for addressing ethnic conflict. The French establishment, for the most part, has been reticent to face up to these problems or their root causes, reluctant to accept the U.S. as a model - or as a partner. The Ministry of Education, however, has shown its willingness to engage with us in this area. ¶24. ENCOURAGE REFORM. We must continue to encourage and help to empower moderate social reformers in France to preempt and thwart those who would aggravate social discontent for the purposes of extremist recruiting. --------------------------------------------- -- Humanitarian/Development Issues to be addressed --------------------------------------------- -- ¶25. Although France has a highly developed, modern economy with significant resources at its disposal, much of the discontent reported by French minority communities relates to economic and social exclusion. While direct development assistance from the USG is not likely to be available for France, some USG financial and program resources were and will continue to be deployed to address the consequences of discrimination and minority exclusion in France. Some French NGOs working to assist minority youth, for example, received financial and other support - such as invitations to participate in exchange programs - through the Embassy to pursue specific programs. ------------------------ Target Audiences by Goal ------------------------ ¶26. DEMONSTRATE COMMITMENT. We need to show the USG takes seriously the threat of disenfranchised and disadvantaged minorities around the world, including in France, and we are committed to empowering minorities as part of our fundamental belief in participatory democracy. ¶27. Our target audiences for this goal include both Muslims and non-Muslims: at-risk youth, professionals who serve them, NGO leaders, and the media, both national and regional. We will continue to engage resident Muslim country diplomats to improve their understanding of the U.S. We also must continue to educate ourselves systematically on Islam through such efforts as our in-house speaker program, which recently invited a prominent French scholar on Islam to address a lunchtime roundtable for Embassy staffers. ¶28. While much of the existing effort already ties into our current Embassy public diplomacy strategy, increased funding for exchanges, speakers and grants would be most welcome. So would more help from Washington with recruiting minority speakers (Francophones) and further access to short-term exchanges, such as ECA's summer institutes, to target minority educators.  Â29. SHARE EXPERIENCES. We must continue communication in a broad and frequent manner to audiences in France about our own American experience with ethnic and social conflict. We need to demonstrate our legitimate standing on this issue in order to strengthen the sense of shared values and common cause between Americans and the French. ¶30. Our target audience for this goal, again, is Muslim and non-Muslim, but especially the media, NGOs, educators, and French youth (students and professionals.) All need to engage - themselves and each other - to resolve the minority problems facing France. ¶31. As with the earlier goal, a considerable effort is already underway, tied to our existing public diplomacy strategy, but increased funding for exchanges, speakers and grants would enable us to reinforce our current efforts. ¶32. ENCOURAGE REFORM. We need to encourage moderate social reformers in France and thwart those who would aggravate social discontent for the purposes of extremist recruiting. ¶33. Our target audience for this goal should be both social reform elements and the individual young Muslims most likely to be targeted by extremist recruiters. The reformers need to be encouraged and resourced. The minority youth need to believe that they have a bright future in their adopted country and that they have nothing to gain and much to lose by association with extremist violence. Specific programs we could deploy to address these audiences include our existing media and Information Resource Center outreach efforts, increased targeting of our exchange programs to those engaged on minority issues, and expanded personal outreach by the entire Mission staff via our in-house public speaker program. A concerted effort will also be made to increase invitations to Muslims and other minorities for Mission representational events, not only in Paris but also in our field posts across France. Again, increased funding for exchanges, speakers and grants would enable us to reinforce our current efforts. ----------------------- Measuring Effectiveness ----------------------- ¶34. We will now identify our minority outreach efforts more clearly as such in our routine program reporting, tying into the new PD evaluation project led by ECA's PD Evaluation Office. We will measure our effectiveness in terms of audience and participant totals, improved French media treatment of minority issues, improved perceptions of the U.S. among minority audiences, and the initiation of new policies and programs by the French government and/or French non-governmental organizations to improve the lot of French Arabs and Muslims. ---------------- Embassy Contacts ---------------- ¶35. Minority engagement officers for Embassy Paris are PDOff Colombia Barrosse (BarrosseCX@state.gov, x 4541), who coordinates our programmatic outreach and PolOff William S. (Steve) Wells (WellsWS@state.gov, x 4284), who tracks minority issues for reporting. STAPLETON 
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