le courrier diplomatique

Publié le 10 Décembre 2010

Dans un télégramme consacré à la " danse du ventre " de la diplomatie Etasunienne devant les minorités Françaises et plus particulièrement devant la communauté musulmane Française , j'ai relevé quelques éléments sur la stratégie de pénétration de la diplomatie Etasunienne des media Français .

Si ce télégramme décrit et critique de manière lucide la structure capitalistique et l'esprit de caste des journalistes Français - cette " écume des vagues " que j'évoquais dans un autre article et qui est développée  dans les media Français à propos de ce télégramme - c'est bien la stratégie de pénétration des media Français qui mérite d'être retenue comme l'élèment le plus intéressant . Il faut en particulier desormais mettre un nom sur ces " USG surrogates " qui interviennent dans les media Français . Le télégramme révéle aussi que dans cette volonté de comunautariser la France ,et dans l'objectif  de " mettre du rouge à lévres sur un porc" cad de présenter les Etats-Unis sous un aspect amical ,  la diplomatie Etasunienne compte sur le soutien de ... l'Education Nationale ainsi que d'ONG financées par le Département d'Etat .

Le télégramme  donne les adresses mel des responsables de la startégie Etasunienne vis à vis des minorités en France .

Il faut ici signaler que selon la législation Brésilienne , les ONG recevant des fonds de la part d'une ambassade étrangère devraient les déclarer aux services fiscaux ainsi qu'au public .

On comprend pourquoi de tels dispositifs législatifs sont combattus par le gouvernement Etasunien partout à travers le monde au nom de la " démocratie " .

Cette déclaration concerne les particuliers aux Etats Unis : C'est le Foreign Agent Registration Act que j'ai évoqué sur ce blogue à propos de l'affaire d'espionnage qui a éclaté aux Etats-Unis l'été dernier . Comme je l'ai écrit à l'époque , et concernant justement cet activisme Etasunien au sein des minorités Françaises , il grand temps que le législateur Français développe un projet de loi similaire en France : La pénetration  de notre haute adminstration , de la Justice , des Douanes ne rend que plus urgent une telle législation .

Ce télégramme devrait en tout cas inciter Bercy à mener des enquêtes fiscales sérieuses parmi ces associations " non - gouvernementales " .

Concernant l'Education Nationale , si le télégramme fait clairement allusion  aux responsables ministériels * , il convient desormais de s'interroger si la pénétration des envoyés de l'Ambassade Etasunienne -  minority engagement officers -  - a atteint les rectorats , le corps des inspecteurs et le corps professoral et quels sont les " activités pédagogiques " qui ont été développées en collaboration avec le Departement d'Etat .

C'est une responsabilité des syndicats de l'Education Nationale de demander des explications écrites au Ministère sur ce sujet .

Ice Station Zebra publiera de manière anonyme tous les témoignages .

* Compte tenu de la date du télégramme et du début de la stratégie de penetration des minorités qui remonte à 2003 il peut s'agir de MM. Luc Ferry , François Fillon ou Gilles de Robien et plus probablement du dernier M. Gilles de Robien .

 

 

Télégramme 07PARIS306 du 25 janvier 2007 .

 

 UNCLAS PARIS 000306 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS For EUR/PGI (Weinstein), EUR/PPD (Davis) E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OPRC PREL PHUM KPAO KISL FR XG SUBJECT: ENGAGEMENT WITH MUSLIM COMMUNITIES - FRANCE REF: 06 STATE 185834 Sensitive but unclassified - entire text. Please protect accordingly. ¶1. Summary: The Ambassador and all of Mission France support a sustained and focused effort to engage France's Muslim minorities, recognizing that organizing and executing such an effort will continue to require considerable discretion, sensitivity and tact on our part. Although there is some evidence that France's Muslim minorities are better integrated than their counterparts elsewhere in Europe, the French have a well-known problem with discrimination against minorities. French media has fallen short in their reporting on these issues and French government and private institutions also found it difficult to face up squarely to the challenges involved. We can engage the French both privately and via the media on the issue of minority inclusion, but superior French language skills are crucial to make effective use of the French broadcast media. Â2. Our specific goals for this strategy: a) demonstration of our commitment to these issues, b) sharing of our American experiences in managing diversity, and c) encouraging social reforms within France to improve the lot of its minorities. ¶3. Post will continue to grow its established minority outreach effort, identifying Arab-Muslim outreach projects as such in expanded program reporting. Effectiveness will be measured in terms of audience and participant totals, improved French media treatment of minority issues, a measurably improved perception of the U.S. among target audiences, and the initiation of new policies and programs by both the French government and French non-governmental organizations to improve the lot of French Arabs and Muslims. ¶4. Contact information for post's designated minority engagement officers - PDOff Colombia Barrosse and PolOff William Stephen Wells - is in the last paragraph. End summary. ------------- The Challenge ------------- ¶5. Reftel tasked post to produce a '07 - '08 public outreach strategy for engaging France's Muslim minorities, to counter terrorist recruiting among them, and to foster their greater integration into mainstream French society. We regret the late response to this tasking. ¶6. Embassy Paris and its seven field posts began to reach out systematically to France's Arab and Muslim populations several years ago, in 2003, targeting neighborhoods and institutions known to have large immigrant populations (first, second and third generation.) Since that time post established a broad base of political reporting on French Muslim issues, and the post's Public Affairs Section increasingly focused its program assets (speakers, DVCs, exhibits, exchanges and grants) on minority communities, under the more acceptable rubric of "civil society" outreach. ¶7. Organizing and executing this outreach required sensitivity and discretion due to France's particular philosophical outlook and history. It has the largest Muslim minority population in Western Europe, both as an absolute number and as a percentage of the national population. France's five million plus Muslims are largely North African (Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian) in origin, although they remain diverse and resistant to blanket categorization. The French Government's approach to religion and minorities traditionally has been to promote assimilation under the banner of equality, however imperfectly that goal has been achieved, with a strong emphasis on "laicite" (secularism) in public spaces. This policy demands official blindness to all racial and ethnic differences. French law formally prohibits the collection of statistics on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic background; and only approximate figures are available to us regarding France's minorities, including Muslims. ¶8. Concepts such as "affirmative action," "diversity," "multiculturalism," or compound descriptions of identity (e.g. Arab-American) are relatively new and somewhat controversial in France, where the approach has been more to target specific geographic enclaves, e.g. educational programs for neighborhoods with a high percentage of socio-economically disadvantaged (often Arab and Muslim) youth. ¶9. Young French citizens across the religious spectrum tend not to be practicing/devout, but disadvantaged minority youth remain an obvious target for extremist recruiting. As a result of recent events (including the November 2005 unrest in the suburbs), diversity and integration are discussed more openly - at conferences, as well as on talk shows and campuses. Nevertheless, it remains generally indelicate in France to ask a person's religious affiliation. Challenging the government's approach to assimilation can amount to challenging the basis of French identity within the Republic. ¶10. The organization and execution of any official USG Muslim outreach strategy in such an environment - whatever the strong justification in our eyes - will continue to require considerable and continuing discretion, sensitivity and tact. ----------------- Media Environment ----------------- ¶11. As in other European countries, French media reporting of U.S. policies and intentions is often skeptical. Reporting by the mainstream media on Arab Muslims and their issues, however, is typically not so much negative as negligent, falling short both in its coverage of discrimination towards them and of juvenile delinquency among them. ¶12.  
 Official Americans and pro-USG surrogates have ready access to most French media to convey official policy messages,but using that access effectively presents a special challenge. Superior French language and presentation skills are especially important for making effective use of French broadcast media. Communicating to the French about the treatment of their minorities, a topic they themselves are often reticent to explore in depth, is more difficult for us than, say, describing our own, American experience. Any ill-prepared efforts to reach out to France's Muslim audiences could easily become counter-productive. We therefore must continue to proceed with care. ¶13. Our primary media focus needs to be on TV and radio, but print - and the new media - should not be ignored. Â14. Fewer or less than one French adult in four reads a national newspaper regularly. Regional papers are still important, however, with Ouest France (Rennes) being the largest daily. The French are more avid magazine readers, buying over three billion copies a year. Â15. French broadcasting is partly state-owned and partly in the hands of private enterprise. Most French TV viewers still, reportedly, prefer the six major broadcast channels, but the number of channels offered by various cable and satellite operators continues to grow, with the newest being France 24, a CNN-like 24-hour news-station. Average French TV viewership is over five and one-half hours per day. ¶16. Radio, especially FM, remains an important medium in France: over 99 per cent of French households own at least one radio and almost 5 in 6 over the age of 13 year listen to the radio daily. As with TV, French radio is part state-owned and part private. ¶17. Top French journalists are often products of the same elite schools as many French government leaders. These journalists do not necessarily regard their primary role as to check the power of government. Rather, many see themselves more as intellectuals, preferring to analyze events and influence readers more than to report events. ¶18. The private sector media in France - print and broadcast - continues to be dominated by a small number of conglomerates, and all French media are more regulated and subjected to political and commercial pressures than are their American counterparts. The Higher Audio-Visual Council, created in 1989, appoints the CEOs of all French public broadcasting channels and monitors their political content. ¶19. Internet access is growing steadily in France, especially among the younger generation, rapidly replacing traditional media. All important television and radio channels in France have their own websites, as do the major print media. Blogs are an increasingly popular method of communication for minorities and NGOs, who use them to express opinions they do not feel are reflected in the traditional media. ¶20. France's first generation Arab immigrants typically continue to read publications from their countries of origin, and the major Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian papers are widely available in larger French cities. These individuals also watch satellite and cable TV stations in Arabic, including Al-Jazeerah TV. Second and third generation French Arabs, however, are typically not literate in Arab, and their print media habits are similar to those of other French readers. -------------- Specific Goals -------------- ¶21. DEMONSTRATE OUR COMMITMENT. We need to say and show, repeatedly, to Muslim and non-Muslim audiences alike, the USG is engaged for good in the Arab-Muslim world, we respect Islam, and the USG takes seriously the potentially global threat of disenfranchised and disadvantaged minorities in France. For those reasons, and because we believe in participatory democracy, we promote the advancement and full integration of France's minorities into mainstream society. ¶22. SHARE OUR EXPERIENCES. We also must continue to communicate, well and often, to both Muslim and non-Muslim audiences in France, the American experience with ethnic and social conflict - both our successes and our failures - in order to establish our legitimacy for engagement on this issue. We can strengthen the sense of shared values and common cause between Americans and French working for inter-communal cooperation, peace, stability, opportunity and respect. In addition, we need to remain present, listening and showing respect for French (immigrant and non-immigrant) experiences. ¶23. Most French minorities, including Arabs, are somewhat aware of the U.S. experience and positively inclined towards us, seeing us as having tried to address our shortcomings. What many French lack is specific information about or any in-depth understanding of our experience that might help them to conceive of and implement a workable French model for addressing ethnic conflict. The French establishment, for the most part, has been reticent to face up to these problems or their root causes, reluctant to accept the U.S. as a model - or as a partner. The Ministry of Education, however, has shown its willingness to engage with us in this area. ¶24. ENCOURAGE REFORM. We must continue to encourage and help to empower moderate social reformers in France to preempt and thwart those who would aggravate social discontent for the purposes of extremist recruiting. --------------------------------------------- -- Humanitarian/Development Issues to be addressed --------------------------------------------- -- ¶25. Although France has a highly developed, modern economy with significant resources at its disposal, much of the discontent reported by French minority communities relates to economic and social exclusion. While direct development assistance from the USG is not likely to be available for France, some USG financial and program resources were and will continue to be deployed to address the consequences of discrimination and minority exclusion in France. Some French NGOs working to assist minority youth, for example, received financial and other support - such as invitations to participate in exchange programs - through the Embassy to pursue specific programs. ------------------------ Target Audiences by Goal ------------------------ ¶26. DEMONSTRATE COMMITMENT. We need to show the USG takes seriously the threat of disenfranchised and disadvantaged minorities around the world, including in France, and we are committed to empowering minorities as part of our fundamental belief in participatory democracy. ¶27. Our target audiences for this goal include both Muslims and non-Muslims: at-risk youth, professionals who serve them, NGO leaders, and the media, both national and regional. We will continue to engage resident Muslim country diplomats to improve their understanding of the U.S. We also must continue to educate ourselves systematically on Islam through such efforts as our in-house speaker program, which recently invited a prominent French scholar on Islam to address a lunchtime roundtable for Embassy staffers. ¶28. While much of the existing effort already ties into our current Embassy public diplomacy strategy, increased funding for exchanges, speakers and grants would be most welcome. So would more help from Washington with recruiting minority speakers (Francophones) and further access to short-term exchanges, such as ECA's summer institutes, to target minority educators.  Â29. SHARE EXPERIENCES. We must continue communication in a broad and frequent manner to audiences in France about our own American experience with ethnic and social conflict. We need to demonstrate our legitimate standing on this issue in order to strengthen the sense of shared values and common cause between Americans and the French. ¶30. Our target audience for this goal, again, is Muslim and non-Muslim, but especially the media, NGOs, educators, and French youth (students and professionals.) All need to engage - themselves and each other - to resolve the minority problems facing France. ¶31. As with the earlier goal, a considerable effort is already underway, tied to our existing public diplomacy strategy, but increased funding for exchanges, speakers and grants would enable us to reinforce our current efforts. ¶32. ENCOURAGE REFORM. We need to encourage moderate social reformers in France and thwart those who would aggravate social discontent for the purposes of extremist recruiting. ¶33. Our target audience for this goal should be both social reform elements and the individual young Muslims most likely to be targeted by extremist recruiters. The reformers need to be encouraged and resourced. The minority youth need to believe that they have a bright future in their adopted country and that they have nothing to gain and much to lose by association with extremist violence. Specific programs we could deploy to address these audiences include our existing media and Information Resource Center outreach efforts, increased targeting of our exchange programs to those engaged on minority issues, and expanded personal outreach by the entire Mission staff via our in-house public speaker program. A concerted effort will also be made to increase invitations to Muslims and other minorities for Mission representational events, not only in Paris but also in our field posts across France. Again, increased funding for exchanges, speakers and grants would enable us to reinforce our current efforts. ----------------------- Measuring Effectiveness ----------------------- ¶34. We will now identify our minority outreach efforts more clearly as such in our routine program reporting, tying into the new PD evaluation project led by ECA's PD Evaluation Office. We will measure our effectiveness in terms of audience and participant totals, improved French media treatment of minority issues, improved perceptions of the U.S. among minority audiences, and the initiation of new policies and programs by the French government and/or French non-governmental organizations to improve the lot of French Arabs and Muslims. ---------------- Embassy Contacts ---------------- ¶35. Minority engagement officers for Embassy Paris are PDOff Colombia Barrosse (BarrosseCX@state.gov, x 4541), who coordinates our programmatic outreach and PolOff William S. (Steve) Wells (WellsWS@state.gov, x 4284), who tracks minority issues for reporting. STAPLETON 

Voir les commentaires

Rédigé par DanielB

Publié dans #Le courrier diplomatique

Repost0

Publié le 10 Décembre 2010

Alors que la plupart des commentateurs et analystes occidentaux de la politique internationale ont sévéremment critiqué la publication par l'organisation WikiLeaks de télégrammes diplomatiques Etasuniens , le premier Ministre Russe Vladimir Poutine et le Président du Brésil en fonction Lula da Silva viennent de prendre position en faveur de son fondateur Julian Assange qui vient d'être arrété en Grande-Bretagne .

Comme le président Lula dont le message de solidarité vient d'être publiè sur le site officiel de la présidence de la République Brésilienne [ blog du Planalto ]  , on peut s'étonner du mutisme occidental face à cette arrestation alors que cet occident est si prompt à s'enflammer pour dénoncer les "manquements à la démocratie"  et aux " droits de l'homme " partout ailleurs dans le monde .

A l'image du président Lula on peut aussi  dire " Le coupable est celui qui écrit , pas celui qui révéle " .

 

 Le premier ministre Russe Vladimir Poutine a déclaré jeudi de son côté qu'il ne considérait pas comme une manifestation de démocratie l'arrestation du fondateur du site WikiLeaks, Julian Assange, qui a révélé des milliers de câbles confidentiels de la diplomatie américaine.

"Si c'est la démocratie, elle doit être totale. Pourquoi donc a-t-on coffré M.Assange? Est-ce ça, la démocratie?", a dit le chef du gouvernement Russe lors d'une conférence de presse à l'issue des négociations avec son homologue Français François Fillon, en visite à Moscou.

 Les prises de position officielles de MM. Lula da Silva et Poutine contrastent aussi avec les prises de positions des principaux respoonsables politiques et militaires occidentaux face à la publication des télègrammes diplomatiques Etasuniens qui sont dans la droite ligne des prises de positions du Département d'Etat . On notera en particulier la servilité de M. Besson [ avec qui je n'ai aucun lien de parenté ] qui voulait interdire le site en France .

 

Comme je l'ai souligné sur ce blogue , et le président Lula aborde ce sujet , ces télégrammes révélent surtout la vision du monde de la diplomatie Etasunienne et des chefs politiques et militaires Etasuniens et à ce titre ils sont particulièremment intéressants pour le " grand public " qui voit ainsi cette diplomatie mise à nue !

 

Note de l'Editeur :

Cette video vient d'être publiè sur le site de l'ISAPE [ voir lien à droite ] , un site d'analyses des relations internationales tenu par des étudiants et doctorants Brésiliens en RI et sécurité .

La communauté des blogueurs Brésiliens [ Geopolitica Brasil , Plano Brasil , ISAPE ,..... ] mélange de " professionnels " et d' " amateurs " des questions de géopolitique approuve dans sa grande majorité ainsi que la communauté Russophone la publication des cablegates à contario par exemple de la communauté Francophone qui semble particulièremment sclérosée et conservatrice sur ce sujet .On peut y voir là la manifestation d'un " esprit de caste " qui a toujours considéré en France l'accés à l'information et la rétention d'informations  comme un levier de pouvoir .Ceci est particulièremment sensible dans les éditoriaux de certains journalistes qui ont affirmé que l'information se devait d'être " filtrée " par leurs soins avant sa divulgation au " grand public " .

Alors que cette communauté journalistique et de blogueurs se focalise sur " l'écume des vagues " , la plupart des analyses non-francophones et non-anglophones de ces télégrammes se focalise sur le modus operandi des diplomates Etasuniens .

  

 

Voir les commentaires

Rédigé par DanielB

Publié dans #Le courrier diplomatique

Repost0

Publié le 7 Décembre 2010

Un télégramme datant du 15 décembre 2009 - soit il y un an - émis par la secretaire d'état Hillary Clinton concernant l'extension d'un plan de défense concernant la Pologne - EAGLE GUARDIAN - à l'ensemble du théatre Baltique .

Selon le câble STATE 127892 du 16 décembre 2009  , c'est  l'Allemagne qui serait à l'origine de cette démarche :

 

3. (S) Ambassador Daalder acknowledged in these meetings that Germany  had initiated the proposal for expanding EAGLE GUARDIAN to include the Baltic states. The German PermRep noted that the German Chancellery and Ministry of Defense had signed off on this approach, and MFA approval should come after FM Westerwelle's full briefing on this issue.


La décision effective d'étendre la zone d'effet de EAGLE GUARDIAN a été prise le 22 jnavier 2010 par le comité militaire de l'OTAN :

 

Extrait du câble  USNATO 000035 du 22 janvier 2010

1. (S/REL NATO) On January 22, NATO's Military Committee agreed to expand EAGLE GUARDIAN, the Alliance's contingency plan for the reinforcement and defense of Poland  to also include the defense and reinforcement of Estonia, Latvia , and Lithunaia .

 

 

Gageons que ce télègramme sera serieusement analysé à Moscou et mis en face des dernières déclarations " pacifistes " de l'OTAN . Deja des réactions  soulignent " l'étonnement" , l'irritation et la perplexité  de certains diplomates et députés Russes et il est fort probable que la publication des télègrammes concernant l'extension d'Eagle Guardian vont donner des arguments aux " faucons " qui s'opposent au rapprochement avec l'Alliance et que ceux-ci sont même du " pain béni " pour eux !

Le chef adjoint du comité de la Douma Russe [ chambre basse]  pour les affaires étrangères, Léonid Sloutski  a ainsi souhaité obtenir des explications officielles de la part de la diplomatie ERtasunienne et de l'OTAN sur ce dossier.

 

Aspects interressants :

- Cette stratégie d'extension régionale bénéficie de l'appui du président Barak Obama

- Les peuples de la région qui sont les premiers concernés n' ont pas à prendre part aux débats concernants  l'extension de EAGLE GUARDIAN .

- Cette stratégie d'extension régionale d'un plan de défense concernant un pays doit servir de modéle pour l' " OTAN global " décidé à Lisbonne .

We would also like to make clear that we see the
expansion of EAGLE GUARDIAN as a step toward the possible
expansion of NATO's other existing country-specific contingency
plans into regional plans
This is the first step in a multi-
stage process to develop a complete set of appropriate contingency
plans for the full range of possible threats

  Dans le cadre régional , les projets de réactivation d'un pacte Nordique basé sur la Doctrine Stoltenberg évoquée depuis longtemps sur ce blogue ont été évoqués il ya deux semaines par les états scandinaves .

 

- Les effectifs du QG de l'OTAN à Bruxelles sont " squelettiques " durant les périodes de fin d'année ! Gageons qu'aprés la publication de ce cablegate , certains cadres civils et militaires de l'OTAN ne fêteront pas Noël en famille cette année autour d'une dinde aux marrons ou verront leurs vacances de ski sur les pistes du Colorado écourtées . Le soir de Noël et du 31 décembre ayons une pensée compatissante pour ces lieutenants Drogo des temps modernes qui défendront le Monde Libre dans leur Fort Bastiani Bruxellois devant un télephone dans le cadre d'une " disponibilité opérationnelle " renforcée  !

 

 

 S E C R E T STATE 127892 NOFORN FOLLOWING STATE 127892 DATED 150910Z DEC 09 SENT ACTION RIGA, TALLINN, VILNIUS, USNATO INFO ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE IS BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR ACTION. QUOTE: S E C R E T STATE 127892 SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2019 TAGS: NATO MARR MCAP PREL EN LG LH PL SUBJECT: NATO CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR OUR BALTIC ALLIES REFS: A) USNATO 561 B) USNATO 464 C) VILNIUS 569 D) RIGA 514 Classified By: ACTING EUR A/S NANCY MCELDOWNEY -FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D) ¶1. (U) This is an action cable. Please see paragraphs 2-3. ¶2. (S/NF) Summary and Action Request. The United States is developing a strategy for reaffirming both NATO and U.S. commitment to the core responsibility of the Alliance: collective defense. Examining NATO's approach to contingency planning will be one element of that strategy. Moving from country-specific to regional contingency plans is one potential method. Expanding EAGLE GUARDIAN could be a first step in favor of regional planning. USNATO should engage NATO Secretary General Rasmussen to begin to build support for expanding Eagle Guardian. In early 2010, the U.S. Military Representative (MILREP) at NATO HQ should take the following actions: 1) meet jointly with the Chairman of the Military Committee (CMC), the German MILREP, and other MILREPs as appropriate to urge the CMC to task the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) to include the Baltic States in the revision of EAGLE GUARDIAN, and 2) approach the CMC and request that he task SACEUR to brief the Military Committee on each of NATO's contingency plans with guidance that he identify any gaps in those plans. We will be better positioned to consider a broader regional approach after receiving SACEUR's assessment USNATO and Action Embassies are asked to engage with appropriate Baltic and Polish officials before December 16 to outline the U.S. position, while stressing the need to keep details related to NATO's military plans confidential. Contingency points are also provided at paragraph 4 for responding to public inquiries. End Summary and Action Request. ¶3. (S) Washington shares USNATO's goal of a non-politicized process for moving forward.  Washington believes that increased public attention on the issue could complicate our efforts to achieve that goal. We need to make that point clearly to our Baltic Allies and Poland, while also underscoring that we take their request for NATO contingency planning seriously and support steps to address their concerns. We understand Baltic and Polish leaders will meet on December 16 and will discuss, among other topics, NATO contingency planning. It will be important to engage with Baltic and Polish officials in advance of that meeting to both outline our support for expanding EAGLE GUARDIAN, and our vision for a process that can deliver a successful result. In discussions with Baltic and Polish officials, Action Posts should draw upon the points below. (S/REL NATO) Begin Talking Points: FOR RIGA, TALLINN, AND VILNIUS -- The United States has taken careful note of the repeated requests by all three Baltic states for NATO contingency planning for the defense of the Baltic region. -- The United States believes that NATO - as a matter of course - should conduct appropriate contingency planning for the possible defense of Allied territory and populations. NATO's Article 5 commitment requires no less. -- As President Obama said in Prague: "We must work together as NATO members so that we have contingency plans in place to deal with new threats, wherever they may come from." -- After spending the last several months examining options on how to carry out NATO contingency planning for the Baltic states, the United States has decided that the best course of action would be to take advantage of the ongoing revision of the existing defense of Poland plan, EAGLE GUARDIAN. EAGLE GUARDIAN could be expanded to include the defense of the Baltic states. This expansion is a logical military extension of the existing contingency plan and fits well within the scenario posited by EAGLE GUARDIAN. -- We would also like to make clear that we see the expansion of EAGLE GUARDIAN as a step toward the possible expansion of NATO's other existing country-specific contingency plans into regional plans.  This is the first step in a multi- stage process to develop a complete set of appropriate contingency plans for the full range of possible threats -- both regional and functional -- as soon as possible. At the same time, we believe contingency planning is only one element of NATO's Article 5 preparedness. -- The United States is prepared to work closely with NATO Military Authorities and with other Allies to forge a consensus in favor of expanding EAGLE GUARDIAN to include the defense of the Baltic states, starting immediately in the new year when NATO reopens following its winter break. (S/REL NATO) FOR WARSAW -- The United States has taken careful note of the repeated requests by all three Baltic states for NATO contingency planning for the defense of the Baltic region. -- The United States believes that NATO - as a matter of course - should conduct appropriate contingency planning for the possible defense of Allied territory and populations. NATO's Article 5 commitment requires no less. -- As President Obama said in Prague: "We must work together as NATO members so that we have contingency plans in place to deal with new threats, wherever they may come from." -- After spending the last several months examining options for how to carry out NATO contingency planning for the Baltic states, the United States has decided that the best course of action would be to take advantage of the ongoing revision of the existing defense of Poland plan, EAGLE GUARDIAN. EAGLE GUARDIAN could be expanded to include the defense of the Baltic states. -- This expansion is a logical military extension of the existing contingency plan and fits well within the scenario posited by EAGLE GUARDIAN. In fact, defending Poland necessarily entails defending the Baltic states, as well. -- We would also like to make clear that we see the expansion of EAGLE GUARDIAN as a step toward the possible expansion of NATO's other existing country-specific contingency plans into regional plans. This is the first step in a multi- stage process to develop a complete set of appropriate contingency plans for the full range of possible threats - both regional and functional - as soon as possible. At the same time, we believe contingency planning is only one element of NATO's Article 5 preparedness. -- The United States is prepared to work closely with NATO Military Authorities and with other Allies to forge a consensus in favor of expanding EAGLE GUARDIAN to include the defense of the Baltic states, starting immediately in the new year when NATO reopens following its winter break. -- We do not believe that this will result in any significant delays for concluding the EAGLE GUARDIAN revision. Nor do we believe that this in any way endangers planning for the defense of Poland. In fact, we believe that the planning for the defense of Poland will be much more robust with the inclusion of the Baltics. (S/REL NATO) POINTS ABOUT PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF PLANS (FOR USE AT POST'S DISCRETION) -- The United States believes strongly that such planning should not be discussed publicly. These military plans are classified at the NATO SECRET level . -- The Alliance has many public diplomacy tools at its disposal. Contingency planning is not one of them. What we should do is explore other public steps for demonstrating the vitality of Article 5, such as exercises, defense investment, and partnerships. -- Public discussion of contingency plans undermines their military value, giving insight into NATO's planning processes. This weakens the security of all Allies. -- Public discussion of the plan would also make it politically much more difficult for some Allies to support the EAGLE GUARDIAN revision, creating divisions within the Alliance and throwing the whole project into doubt. - - A public discussion of contingency planning would also likely lead to an unnecessary increase in NATO-Russia tensions, something we should try to avoid as we work to improve practical cooperation in areas of common NATO-Russia interest. -- We believe that the proposed revision of EAGLE GUARDIAN is achievable and will represent a significant response to the Baltic request for contingency planning. -- We hope that we can count on your support in these efforts, including on keeping discussions on NATO contingency planning out of the public domain. -- We should work together on using exercises, defense investment, and partnerships to demonstrate to our publics that Article 5's value ultimately lies in NATO's capabilities and deterrence, rather than specific planning. (C) FOR ALL ACTION POSTS -- IF ASKED Q: Why wait until the new year? Why not start now? A: NATO Headquarters is heading into its winter break, when only a skeletal staff is in place. Our ability to achieve success in this matter will be substantially improved once senior Allied personnel have returned to work early in the new year. We pledge to take the matter up expeditiously at that time.  Q: Will waiting until the new year give NATO Military Authorities sufficient time to complete the revision of the EAGLE GUARDIAN? A: According to our conversations with NATO's senior military authorities, beginning the process of incorporating the Baltic states into EAGLE GUARDIAN in early January still gives them sufficient time to complete the revision by February as originally planned. ¶4. (C) Washington strongly prefers that discussion of NATO's contingency plans in general, and the possible expansion of EAGLE GUARDIAN in particular, remain in confidential channels. However, posts may use the points below if necessary in responding to public queries about these issues. (U) PUBLIC/PRESS INQUIRIES -- IF ASKED: -- NATO does not discuss specific plans. -- As a matter of course, however, NATO does planning in order to be as prepared as possible for whatever situations might arise, particularly as relates to its ability to carrying out its Article 5 commitments. -- Plans are not static. NATO is constantly reviewing and revising its plans. -- NATO planning, however, is an internal process designed to make the Alliance as prepared as possible for future contingencies. It is not "aimed" at any other country. -- President Obama acknowledged this when he said at Prague that "We must work together as NATO members so that we have contingency plans in place to deal with new threats, wherever they may come from." CLINTON UNQUOTE CLINTON 

 

Voir les commentaires

Rédigé par DanielB

Publié dans #Le courrier diplomatique

Repost0

Publié le 5 Décembre 2010

Extrait du télégramme 09BRASILIA634 du 19 mai 2009 .

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000634
BRAZIL'S FIGHTER PURCHASE: ENDGAME STRATEGY

 

 

Note de l'Editeur :

La principale menace consiste à utiliser le fait que des composants , en particulier l'avionique d'acquisition et de désignation des cibles  , du Rafale sont fabriqués aux Etats-Unis et brandir la possibilité d' un " embargo technologique " .

Une leçon à retenir pour notre industrie de la Défense ...

  La stratégie Etasunienne passe aussi par la cooptation de sénateurs " clés " , " recrutés " lors d'une visite aux EU et la désignation d" un " Mr.Super Hornet " chargé de monter l'excellente santé économique de Boeing par rapport à celle de ses compétiteurs .

 

Making the Case
---------------

¶6. (S/NF) We have been successful in getting across the
points that the Super Hornet is a highly capable aircraft,
and now need to focus on the broader picture -- how
partnership on the fighter sale will yield benefits for both
sides both in military terms and in economic benefits. As
the world,s largest aerospace company, Boeing is able to
offer a much greater scope of opportunities for Braziliaian
industry, including some outside of the FX2 offset program.
The early June visit of Brazilian legislators to Washington
will be an opportunity to get the message to political
leaders. By focusing on key Senators, we have the
opportunity to bring on board individuals who can influence
the decision makers and ensure that the people who will have
to approve spending Brazilian government money understand
that the F18 offers them the best value. Embassy will
continue to highlight tech transfer and Expand our message
to include economic benefits to Brazil  of the Boeing
proposal. We also recommend the following:

-- Make an expert on the aerospace industry available for
interview to highlight economic health of Boeing compared to
its competitors.
-- Use visit of Brazilian Congress to drive home message
that partnership with the U.S. entails benefits to both sides
that go well beyond offset program. Ensure that Brazilian
Senators understand significantly lower life
cycle costs of the Super Hornet

 

 

Attack the French Bid
---------------------

¶7. (S/NF) Although the French offer a less capable fighter
at a higher cost, the Rafale has been the presumptive winner
since the inception of the FX2 competition. While the
technical evaluations of the aircraft should result in a
significant advantage for the Super Hornet, we need to take
steps to erode the French political edge. While a major
element of this will be highlighting Boeing,s lower cost,
there are several other measures that can make a case against
the French. The first step will be to remind the Braziliaians
that their interest in the Rafale was driven by an assumption
that the United States would not release technology. Since
we have approved release of the relevant technology, we
should ask if Brazil  still needs the French as a safety.
Over the last few months, the French sales effort has been
based on a misleading, if not fraudulent, claim that their
plane involves only French content (rendering it free of
meddlesome U.S. export controls). This is not the case. A
DTSA analysis found a high level of U.S. content, including
targeting systems, radar components and safety systems that
will require U.S. licenses.

 

Next steps:

-- Although it does not appear that the tech data provided
with the French bid violated ITAR regs, PM/DDTC and DTSA
should continue to monitor French marketing to ensure
Dassault does not skirt ITAR restrictions.
-- Investigate India,s decision to drop the Rafale from its
fighter competition to see if there is a reason that would
make the aircraft less attractive to Brazil --

- Ensure the Brazilians are aware that we expect to be issuing retransfer licenses for U.S.-origin components on the French plane and have already approved transfer of some technical data.

 

  Selon le Brigadier Juniti Saito , commandant de la FAB , le Super Hornet aurait des caractéristiques supérieures au Rafale et aurait la préférence des pilotes Brésiliens tout en présentant sur le long terme des couts d'entretien moins élevés mais que le point crucial restait en juillet 2009 la question du transfert des technologies . Les rencontres avec la diplomatie Etasunienne et le commandant du SOUTHCOM du MD Nelson Jobim et du commandant de la FAB Junini Saito ont été encouragées par le Président Lula lors de sa rencontre avec Barak Obama lors du sommet de L'Aquila .

 

La FAB n'a jamais caché son opposition à l'achat de l'avion Français .

 

Télégramme BRASILIA 000952 du 31 juillet 2009 .

BRAZIL,S AIR FORCE COMMANDER ASKS FOR STATE ASSURANCES ON TECH TRANSFER BY AUGUST 6

¶1. (S/NF) At a July 30 dinner for visiting SouthCom Commander General Doug Fraser, Brazil,s Air Force (BRAF) commander, Brigadier Juniti Saito (protect), pulled Ambassador Sobel and Political Counselor aside to discuss the FX-2 Fighter purchase. He said that there was no question from a technical point of view that the F18 was the superior aircraft. &We have been flying U.S. equipment for decades,8 he said, ∧ we know that it is dependable and that maintenance is simple and cost-effective through FMS.8 That has to be factored into the cost of the new fighter, he said, as the BRAF will likely be using the plane for thirty or forty years. It is the best decision, he said, and the French can,t complain as they just signed a USD 14 billion deal with Brazil (for submarines and helicopters).

¶2. (S/NF) Saito stressed, however, that the question regarding USG commitment to technology transfer remains &a significant political barrier8 that is extremely important to overcome. Saito asked whether the letter he had requested that assured technology transfer (reftel) would be forthcoming. The Ambassador assured him that we understood how important it was to overcome this issue, and said he believed it was in the final stage of approval. Relieved, Saito said he needed the letter in hand by August 6. He said, however, that the decision would not be announced until &after September 7.8 (Note: French President Sarkozy will visit Brazil next month and attend national day festivities on September 7 as part of the &Year of France in Brazil8 activities. End note.)

¶3. (S/NF) Saito reiterated how important President Obama,s discussion on the FX-2 sale with President Lula at Aquila had been, saying, &It opened the door for me to approach the Ambassador as I have.8 He said that President Lula had instructed Defense Minister Jobim and Brigadeiro Saito to meet with General Jones during his upcoming visit and requested an office call by General Jones.

¶4. (S/NF) Comment: This was Saito,s clearest expression that he plans to recommend the F18. Post is working to set up a meeting between General Jones and Brigadier Saito on August 4. Post further understands that Under Secretary Tauscher is prepared to deliver the letter Saito requested to Defense Minister Jobim and Foreign Minister Amorim during the visit, and believes this will be seen as a significant sign of USG support for Boeing,s offer. SOBEL

 

null 

 

Voir les commentaires

Rédigé par DanielB

Publié dans #Le courrier diplomatique

Repost0

Publié le 5 Décembre 2010

" Le sage montre le doigt , l'imbécile regarde la lune "

J'invite les Lusophones , mais aussi les Francophones équipés d'un traducteur Google , à vous rendre sur le site d'un jeune doctorant Brésilien en RI - Daniel Cardoso Tavares - qui a entrepris une démarche d'analyse approfondie des télégrammes du cablegate , avec bien sûr une priorité en ce qui concerne le Brésil .

Il est le rédacteur du site " Politica Externa Brasileira " qui se veut à la fois une compilation de textes et d'interventions lièes à la Politique Etrangère Brésilienne mais aussi internationale , un centre analytique et aussi une aide à la préparation de concours dans le domaine des RI  avec en priorité la préparation au concours d'entrée à l'Instituto Rio Branco - L' " Ecole Nationale des Cadres " de la diplomatie Brésilienne .

On notera sa démarche : Citer le télègramme en entier et non pas comme le font la plupart des articles de la presse Française en retirer des " moceaux juteux " sans même donner la référence du télégramme .

Cette démarche d'honneteté intellectuelle présente en sus l'avantage au lecteur de confronter son propre point de vue à celui de l'analyste et éventuellement de retirer de ce télégramme des informations qui n'auraient pas été traités . 

En toute immodestie , c'est sa démarche d'analyse des télégrammes du cablegate que j'ai choisi dans la rubrique " Le courrier diplomatique " : Au delà de l' " information spectacle " disséquée par la presse Française - Berlusconi est un ami de Poutine ou Erdogan posséde cinq comptes bancaires en Suisse - je préfére en retirer la substantifique moelle :

- Analyser l'attitude de la diplomatie Etasunienne vis à vis de ses " alliès " traités de " stewards "

- Analyser les stratégies de pénétration des gouvernements que ce soit au niveau ministériel , administratif [ Justice , Douanes , ... ] ou au niveau de la " société civile "

On peut deja dégager deux axes de cette stratégie au vu des télégrammes concernant par exemple la France , l'Italie et le Brésil

1- S'appuyer sur des relais en dehors du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères pour appuyer des politiques en matière de sécurité et de défense .

2- La " danse du ventre " de cette diplomatie devant les communautés musulmanes , que ce soit dans le" 9-3 " avec la cooptation de l'ex- présidente de l'association " Ni putes , ni soumises "  Mme Samira Cadasse ou de Jihad Hammadeh recteur d'une mosquée dans la communauté musulmane de Sao-Paulo .

 

  Ex : Télégramme 10PARIS58: EMBASSY PARIS - MINORITY ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY

          Télégramme 09SAOPAULO653 Consulate Sao Paulo - Scenesetter for SR Farah Pandith's Visit to BRAZIL : Sao Paulo's muslims

 

 Les premiers " dommages collatéraux  "de la publication de ces télègrammes se font déja sentir : Ils ont  brisé les liens de " confiance " établis par la diplomatie Etasunienne avec leurs relais ministériels , administratifs ou au sein de la " société civile " . Personne ne veut en effet plus voir apparaître son nom dans la liste des " visiteurs du soir " des ambassades Américaines !

 

 

Voir les commentaires

Rédigé par DanielB

Publié dans #Le courrier diplomatique

Repost0

Publié le 4 Décembre 2010

La presse Française - je citerais ici l'article de Mme Laure Mandeville du Figaro qui fait censurer de manière quasi systématique mes commentaires - et internationale fait ses choux gras des révelations de l'organisation WikiLeaks concernant les relations amicales entre MM. Silvio Berlusconi et Vladimir Poutine . Il s'agit plus précisemment du télégramme du 9 juin 2009 donné en annexe ci-dessous établi par Elizabeth Dibble alors Chargé d'Affaires  de l'ambassade américaine à Rome

J'avais déja analysé sur ce blogue de manière circonstanciée  les attaques dont a été victime M. Berlusconi au cours de l'automne 2009 [ 1 ] que beaucoup d'analystes indépendants en Italie pensent être téléguidées depuis Washington et ce télegramme ne fait que confirmer que les attaques - y compris les attaques ad hominem -  contre M.Berlusconi et accessoirement contre M. Paolo Scaroni PDG de l'ENI sont motivées uniquement à l'aune de sa politique énergetique indépendante , héritère de celle du  Condotirerre Enrico Mattei , et en particulier de sa politique pro-active dans le dossier du gazoduc " South-Stream " .

C'est en effet M. Silvio Berlusconi qui a réussi à rapprocher au cours de l'été 2009 les positions de MM. Poutine et Erdogan sur le tracé du gazoduc " South-Stream " sur le plateau  continental Turc et la question d'une participation Turque à ce projet  vital pour l'indépendance energétique - la véritable indépendance et non pas celle présentée par Washington -  de l'Europe .

Il faut ici noter la simultaneité de ce télegramme avec l'action diplomatique de M.Berlusconi en ce qui concerne le dossier du " South-Stream " et le début des attaques contre sa personne sur ce thème  , d'abord dans la presse à destination du lectorat Italo-Américain - America Oggi - et ensuite dans la presse financière Anglo-Saxonne dans The Financial Times .

Comme le souligne ce télégramme , l'Italie a aussi un rôle géostratégique important pour les intêrets des Etats-Unis avec la présence de six bases aériennes qui permettent à l'OTAN de se projeter militairement en direction de la Mediterarnée , des  Balkans , de  l'Afrique du Nord , du Proche-Orient et de deux QG de l'Africom en Sicile .

Si l'auteur du télégramme accorde un satisfecit à la politique de M.Berlusconi en ce qui concerne l'occupation Américaine de l'Europe , il traduit aussi l'attitude des Etats-Unis vis à vis d'un alliè : Celui-ci ne peut être qu'inféodé de manière totale aux intêrets Americains et toute veilleité d'indépendance dans quelque domaine que ce soit se doit d'être dénoncée , combattue et anihilée .

  Le premier paragraphe et le dernier paragrpahe sont intéressants dans la mesure ou ils décrivent l'attitude de la diplomatie Etasunienne visà vis des nations allièes , ou du moins considérées comme telles :

 

1- Les institutions représentants la puissance de cette nation allièe - les forces armées et la diplomatie - sur la scéne internationale se doivent d'être soutenues dans la mesure ou elles agissent dans le sens des intêrets des Etats-Unis . A ce titre M. Berlusconi et ses prédecesseurs ont failli dans la mesure ou ils ne les ont pas suffisamment bugétisés .

On retrouve cettte prise de position  dans de nombreux télegrammes ou les critiques sont vives contre les chefs politiques qui n'ont pas par exemple accordé une importance suffisante aux yeux de la diplomatie Etasunienne au financement de la lutte contre le " terrorisme international " ou qui ne coopérent pas suffisamment avec les EU dans ce domaine .

 

2- Les chefs politiques des nations allièes ne sont pas considérés comme des partenaires devant être traités d'égal à égal mais bien  comme des serviteurs - stewards - des intêrets Américains .

M.Berlusconi est ainsi qualifié de " serviteur  erratique " de ces intêrets en raison de ses prises de position tantôt dans la droite ligne de celles du Département d'Etat , tantôt s'opposant aux intêrets Etasuniens .

Les propos récents du ministre Brésilien de la Défense M. Nelson Jobim - pourtant considéré dans certains télégrammes en provenance de l'ambassade de Brasilia comme un " ami des Etats-Unis " - qui présente l'Europe comme inféodée au travers de l'OTAN aux intêrets des Etas-Unis sont d'autant plus pertinents .

 

 

Le paragraphe 3 de ce télégramme décrit l'art subtil que se doivent de maîtriser les représentants diplomatiques Etasuniens à travers le monde dans leurs contacts avec leurs relais politiques au sein des états alliès : Ces relais ne doivent pas apparaître comme de simples porte-paroles de la diplomatie Etasunienne et doivent dans leurs postures monter un degré d'indépendance ...

 Dealing with Berlusconi, therefore, requires a careful balance of close coordination with him and his key advisors while avoiding giving the impression that he can speak on our behalf with many of the world's difficult actors.

 

 

Articles associés :

 [ 1 ]  Cui Bono : "Il caso Berlusconi " aprés " Il caso Matteï " ?  

 

Tuesday, 09 June 2009, 08:11
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ROME 000649
NOFORN
SIPDIS
TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
EO 12958 DECL: 05/31/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, IT
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ITALIAN PM BERLUSCONI'S JUNE 15
VISIT TO WASHINGTON
REF: A) ROME 97 B) MOSCOW 1273
ROME 00000649 001.6 OF 004
Classified By: Elizabeth L. Dibble, Charge d'Affaires, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

 

Summary

 

 

-------

1. (C/NF) Mr. President, your meeting with Italian PM Silvio Berlusconi comes at a time when his closest advisors fear Italy  is losing the credibility and influence that it enjoyed in Washington under the previous U.S. administration. In fact, while Italy has been a stalwart partner and participant in nearly every U.S.-led security operation around the world since the end of the Cold War, domestic political foibles and economic malaise are diluting its international influence. Italy continues to support our efforts in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iraq, and the Balkans, but its diplomatic, economic and military institutions, which the Berlusconi government and its predecessors have starved for resources, are sorely stretched. Berlusconi and his government have tried to compensate for Italy's failure to invest in its instruments of national power by presenting Italy as a mediator and interlocutor with difficult actors on major international issues. This self-appointed role has sometimes complicated international efforts. On Iran, for example, Italy's role under the previous government gave Tehran the impression that the international community was divided. More recently, GOI actions have provided a European platform for Russia's efforts to challenge NATO security interests in Europe. Berlusconi will certainly present himself as the best hope for moderating Russian behavior and will seek a signal from you that he has a mandate to speak on the West's behalf. He will also seek to use Italy's G8 presidency to address issues far beyond the scope and effectiveness of the organization. We should discourage both instincts. Italy has an important voice in the Euro-Atlantic community, but its efforts have proven constructive only when undertaken in coordination with the U.S. and other key allies.

Berlusconi the Politician

2. (C/NF) Our relationship with Berlusconi is complex. He is vocally pro-American and has helped address our interests on many levels in a manner and to a degree that the previous government was unwilling or unable to do, since his return to power last spring as well as in his previous turns in government. In his first 90 days in office, he approved a controversial U.S. base expansion that had been halted by bureaucratic inaction and anti-American political opposition; eliminated caveats on Italian troops in Afghanistan; and allowed us to base two of three AFRICOM component commands in Italy. At the same time, he has criticized Missile Defense, NATO enlargement and support for Kosovo's independence as American provocations of Russia. He claimed Russian PM Putin's military push into Georgia in August 2008 was necessary to end the bloodshed of innocents caused by Georgian President Saakashvili. He displays an overweening self-confidence born of stable and strong political popularity that has made him deaf to dissenting opinion. The strict control he exercises over his government and party inhibits his staff from giving him unpleasant messages. His unorthodox governing style, coupled with his frequent verbal gaffes and high-profile scandals (including public bickering with his wife about his alleged philandering), have caused many, including some inside the U.S. government, to dismiss him as feckless, vain, and ineffective as a modern European leader .



3. (C/NF) His shortcomings notwithstanding, marginalizing Berlusconi would limit important cooperation with a key ally. Berlusconi is one of Europe's most enduring politicians whose popularity in Italy will guarantee that he will influence Italian politics for many years still to come. He has arrested the trend of weak, short-lived Italian governments that has plagued this country since the end of the Second World War. When successfully engaged, he has shown the willingness to adopt policies, however unpopular, in line with ours -- including support for an expanded NATO role in Afghanistan and Turkey's membership in the EU. When ignored, he seeks to carve out a visible, international, and

ROME 00000649 002.6 OF 004

frequently unhelpful role for himself. Dealing with Berlusconi, therefore, requires a careful balance of close coordination with him and his key advisors while avoiding giving the impression that he can speak on our behalf with many of the world's difficult actors.

 

4. (C/NF) Italy held elections for the European Parliament on June 6 and 7, which reaffirmed Berlusconi's People of Liberty (PDL) party as Italy's largest party, reaching 35 percent, well ahead of the main opposition Democratic Party's 26 percent. While Berlusconi does not have a competitive rival in the center left, his party missed the 40 percent mark that it was aiming for, and witnessed the growth of xenophobic coalition ally Northern League (LN). PDL is a personality-driven party, whose members tell us that the ideology is little more than "Berlusconismo." The missed target of 40 percent can be attributed to an over-ambitious Berlusconi, as well as the turnout-depressing effects of weeks of personal attacks by the center left in the runup to the election that included allegations of fiscal and sexual impropriety. An enduring result of the election will be the heightened competition between PDL and LN, who now dominate Italian politics. LN's tough stands on security and against immigration have won broad approval, even as Berlusconi has tried to stem the flow of PDL voters to LN by descending to the anti-immigrant rhetoric usually favored by the Northern League. Additionally, after this mild electoral setback, we can expect Berlusconi to use his White House meeting and his hosting of the G8 to underscore to Italians the important figure he cuts on the world stage.

Economic Crisis

5. (C) Prudent (some would say stodgy) banking practices allowed Italy to avoid the global financial sector meltdown. Italy's banks simply did not engage in sub-prime lending, and they did not buy the toxic assets that caused so much trouble in the U.S. and elsewhere. But Italy has not been able to avoid the pain of the worldwide recession that has followed the financial crisis. Italy's economic growth rate -- which was relatively low even before the crisis -- has dropped precipitously owing to sharp contractions in its export markets and falling domestic demand. Unemployment is expected to exceed eight percent this year and to rise further in 2010. Government tax revenues are, not unexpectedly, off sharply. Italy's already high level of government debt and the debt ceilings that come with EU membership significantly limit the government's ability to provide fiscal stimulus for the economy.

G8

--

6. (C/NF) Berlusconi's stewardship of his G8 Presidency has been marked by a proliferation of Ministerial and sub-ministerial meetings coupled with a last-minute change of summit venue from Sardinia to the earthquake-stricken city of L'Aquila that took even his Sherpa by surprise. He and his cabinet tend to regard Italy's G8 year more as an opportunity to curry favor with G8 outsiders such as Egypt, Spain, and Libya than as a tool to address the world's problems. However, his desire to prevent the G8 from taking a back seat to the G20 on his watch has driven an ambitious agenda that may make useful contributions on climate change, Africa, development, and food security. He will be eager to work with you to build a legacy of G8 deliverables that will bear the Italian label. The Major Economies Forum meeting during the G8 summit, which will include the leaders of 17-plus countries that emit over 80 percent of global emissions, will be an important chance to mobilize high-level consensus in the run-up to the December UN climate change talks in Copenhagen.

Guantanamo Detainees

--------------------

7. (C/NF) Berlusconi welcomed your decision to close Guantanamo, and has publicly and repeatedly underscored Italy's desire to support the move by taking detainees. FM Frattini recently outlined for AG Holder the efforts Italian officials have been making within the EU to negotiate a

ROME 00000649 003.6 OF 004

common EU framework that will open the door to individual country agreements with the U.S. While the junior partner in Berlusconi's coalition opposes taking any detainees, Berlusconi has made it clear that he views this as a moral commitment to support the U.S.

 Russia

8. (C/NF) Dependence on Russian energy, lucrative and frequently nontransparent business dealings between Italy and Russia, and a close, personal relationship between Berlusconi and Putin have distorted the PM's view to the point that he believes much of the friction between the West and Russia has been caused by the U.S. and NATO. Berlusconi believes he, acting as a mediator, can restore a spirit of dialogue and cooperation between Europe, the U.S. and Russia, but largely on Russia's terms, through indefinitely postponing NATO's outreach to Ukraine and Georgia, diluting the EU's efforts to promote democracy in Belarus, and undermining OSCE's important role in promoting human and democratic values across the whole of Europe. Berlusconi has publicly proposed to mediate your relationship with Russian President Medvedev and is hoping you will give him a signal, however small, that he has your blessing to do so. Instead, you can let him know that we believe that issues of security that affect the transatlantic community should be addressed by the Alliance at large, and that the U.S. is not prepared to sacrifice values in exchange for short-term stability predicated on Russian promises of good behavior. And we will react -- and expect others who share these values to do so as well -- when Russia crosses a red-line, for instance in threatening the sovereignty of neighboring states.

Energy

------

9. (C/NF) Berlusconi's close personal ties with Putin and the very strong corporate ties between Italian energy parastatal ENI and Russia's Gazprom often put Italy squarely at odds with USG efforts to reduce Europe's dependence on Russian energy. For example, the Italian government is deeply ambivalent about energy projects that would help Europe diversify its energy imports, while at the same time it is supportive of other projects that would increase Europe's Russian energy dependency. ENI, 30-percent owned by the Italian Government, often dictates GOI energy policy and uses its influence, through the GOI, to block EU energy market liberalization plans. Italy is taking some steps, however, in the right direction, by supporting energy projects that will diversify its own energy sources. It would be helpful if you could raise with Berlusconi long-standing USG concerns about European energy security, emphasizing that increasing the flow of Russian gas around Ukraine is not the same as a policy seeking a true diversity of energy sources, routes and technologies.

10. (C) The Berlusconi Government is pursuing plans to bring back nuclear power to Italy. U.S.-based companies Westinghouse and GE face stiff competition from foreign rivals, particularly France, whose governments are heavily lobbying the GOI. A word to Berlusconi that the U.S. expects this to be a fair and transparent competition is critical if U.S. firms are to have a fair chance to bid for Italian nuclear energy projects.

Iran

----

11. (C/NF) With Italy frustrated by its exclusion from the P5-plus-1 negotiating circle, Berlusconi will highlight Italy's would-be role as an interlocutor between the West, Israel and Iran, claiming excellent relations with all parties involved. He may also push for the U.S. to drop the P5 1 framework altogether. Italian officials were thrilled by your commitment to embark upon direct diplomatic engagement with Iran, but cannot resist the impulse to try to be "present at the creation." FM Frattini has worked strenuously to lock in high-level Iranian attendance at the June 26-27 Afghanistan-Pakistan Outreach meeting, hoping thereby to play host to the first U.S.-Iranian ministerial encounter in decades.

ROME 00000649 004.7 OF 004

Libya

-----

12. (C/NF) Berlusconi has continued Italy's policy of developing an expanded relationship with Libya, largely in order to stem the tide of irregular migration from Libyan shores, but also to gain advantageous access to Libya's oil reserves for Italian firms, mainly ENI. As follow-up to the 2008 Libya-Italy Friendship Treaty -- which committed Libya to sterner measures to deter irregular migrants from entering Italy from its shores, but also offered 5 billion USD in development assistance -- Libyan leader Qadhafi will pay an historic first official visit to Rome June 10-12, just before Berlusconi's Washington visit. As the current African Union President, Qadhafi will be at the G8 Summit in L'Aquila and we anticipate Berlusconi may lobby you to meet with the Libyan leader during your visit.

A Partner in Security

---------------------

13. (C/NF) Berlusconi has maintained a significant military commitment in Afghanistan (2,600 troops, mostly in Italy's Regional-Command West), but has dropped from fourth- to sixth-largest ISAF contributor as other countries like France and Canada have augmented their troop levels. At Stasbourg-Kehl, his government pledged modest increases to cover election security which, if made permanent, would put Italy back in the top tier of ISAF contributors. He has also supported the creation of the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan, doubling the number of Carabinieri police trainers to over 100. Italy has been an anemic contributor to international aid efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan and has cut overall foreign assistance by more than 60 percent in this year's budget. However, Berlusconi knows this is a priority area for the U.S. and will likely respond positively if you press him to do more in the region.

14. (C) Our shared security interests with Italy go beyond Afghanistan. U.S. facilities in Italy provide unmatched freedom of action and are critical to our ability to project stability into the Mediterranean, Middle East and North Africa. We have 15,000 U.S. military on six Italian bases and these installations host some of our most advanced capabilities deployed outside the U.S. Our bases and activities out of Italy are not uniformly popular, but PM Berlusconi, in this government as in his last, has made preserving this security relationship a priority, and the GOI has invariably come through on our top requests, despite domestic political risks. The GOI has approved the expansion of our base at Vicenza to consolidate the 173rd Airborne Brigade, the deployment of the USAF Global Hawk UAV in Sicily, and the establishment of AFRICOM Army and Navy Component Commands on Italian soil. Italy's leadership in other overseas missions helps us concentrate our forces on our top priorities. In addition to its troops in Afghanistan, Italy currently has 2,300 in the Balkans, 2,400 in Lebanon, and is the leading contributor to the NATO Training Mission in Iraq.

Conclusion

----------

15. (C/NF) The robust U.S.-Italian relationship provides us with major national security benefits in our military missions overseas, our own power projection, and on a broad law enforcement agenda, but the Prime Minister is an erratic steward. It might be tempting to dismiss Berlusconi as a frivolous interlocutor, with his personal foibles, public gaffes and sometimes unpredictable policy judgment, but we believe this would be a mistake. Despite his faults, Berlusconi has been the touchstone of Italian politics for the last 15 years, and every indication is that he will be around for years to come. When we are able to successfully engage him in pursuit of our common objectives, he has proved an ally and friend to the United States . He respects and admires the U.S., and is eager to build a strong and successful relationship with you. DIBBLE

---------------

 

 

Photo : © RIA Novosti. Vladimir Rodionov et non pas AP comme l'indique Le Figaro .

 

Voir les commentaires

Rédigé par DanielB

Publié dans #Le courrier diplomatique

Repost0

Publié le 4 Décembre 2010

09TELAVIV1098: ISRAEL, A PROMISED LAND FOR ORGANISED CRIME?

ID 09TELAVIV1098
SUBJECT ISRAEL, A PROMISED LAND FOR ORGANISED CRIME?
DATE 2009-05-15 14:02:00
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
ORIGIN Embassy Tel Aviv
TEXT UNCLAS TEL AVIV 001098

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CORRECTED ADDEE)

DEPT FOR CA/VO/L/C; CA/VO/L/A; CA/FPP SARAH SEXTON; INR/TIPOFF; DS
OFAC
ROME FOR DHS/ICE

CA/FPP: PLEASE PASS TO DOJ LISA HOLTYN AND BRUCE OHR
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958:N/A
TAGS: CVIS SNAR CMGT KFRD KCOR KCRM KTIP PINR IS
SUBJECT: ISRAEL, A PROMISED LAND FOR ORGANISED CRIME?

Summary
---------

¶1. (SBU) Organized crime (OC) has longstanding roots in Israel, but
in recent years there has been a sharp increase in the reach and
impact of OC networks. In seeking a competitive advantage in such
lucrative trades as narcotics and prostitution, Israeli crime groups
have demonstrated their ability and willingness to engage in violent
attacks on each other with little regard for innocent bystanders.
The Israeli National Police (INP) and the courts have engaged in a
vigorous campaign against organized crime leaders, including the
creation of a new specialized anti-OC unit, but they remain unable
to cope with the full scope of the problem. Organized crime in
Israel now has global reach, with direct impact inside the United
States. Post is currently utilizing all available tools to deny
Israeli OC figures access to the United States in order to prevent
them from furthering their criminal activities on U.S. soil. End
Summary.

Crime War Hits the Streets of Israel
-------------------------------------

¶2. (SBU) In November 2008, Israeli crime boss Yaakov Alperon was
assassinated in broad daylight in a gruesome attack on the streets
of Tel Aviv, only about a mile away from the Embassy. According to
several media accounts, a motor scooter pulled up alongside
Alperon's car and the rider attached a sophisticated explosive
device with a remote detonator to the car door. The bomb killed
Alperon and his driver, and injured two innocent pedestrians. The
hit was the latest in a series of violent attacks and reprisals, and
indicated a widening crime war in Israel.

¶3. In July 2008, a 31-year-old Israeli woman was killed by a stray
bullet on the beach in Bat Yam in front of her husband and two
children during a failed assassination attempt on noted crime figure
Rami Amira. In a feud between the Abutbul and Shirazi clans, crime
boss Shalom "Charlie" Abutbul was shot by two gunmen in September
2008, an attack that also wounded three bystanders. In December
2008, Charlie Abutbul's son-in-law, Nati Ohayon, was gunned down in
his car in Netanya. Before the fatal bombing of his car, Alperon
himself had survived at least three previous attempts on his life
before his assassination, and was engaged in an ongoing feud with
the rival Abergil clan (although there are numerous suspects in
Alperon's murder). The day after Alperon's death, two members of
the Abergil syndicate were sentenced for conspiring to kill
Alperon's brother, Nissim, in May 2008.

¶4. (SBU) In response to rising concerns for public safety, former
Prime Minister Olmert convened an emergency meeting of top law
enforcement officials, cabinet members, and prosecutors in December
¶2008. He promised to add 1,000 officers to the INP and to allocate
approximately NIS 340 million (USD 81 million) to improve the INP's
technical capabilities. In general, the rise in OC-related violence
has led some public figures to call for emergency state powers to
attack criminal organizations, and OC became a minor but important
issue in the February 2009 Knesset elections. Former Labor Party MK
Ephraim Sneh publicly decried criminal extortion in his campaign
ads, only to have his car torched in apparent retaliation outside
his home in Herzliya.

Background
------------

¶5. (SBU) Organized criminal activity is not a new phenomenon in
Israel, and major crime families are well known to the Israeli
public (the Alperons even featured in a recent reality television
program). Five or six crime families have traditionally dominated
OC in Israel, although the names and makeup of these syndicates have
fluctuated in recent years. The Abergil, Abutbul, Alperon, and
Rosenstein organizations are among the most well known, but recent
arrests and assassinations have created a power vacuum at the top.
New names such as Mulner, Shirazi, Cohen and Domrani have moved
quickly to fill the gap. Other up-and-coming groups include the
Harari, Ohana, and Kdoshim families. There are also a number of
rival families active in the underworld of Israel's Arab sector.

¶6. (SBU) Traditional OC activities in Israel include illegal
neighborhood casinos, prostitution rings, extortion, and loan
sharking, with each family controlling a different geographic
region. The Alperon family, for instance, dominates the Sharon
region, while the Abutbul operation is based in the coastal city of
Netanya. The focus is largely on easy money guaranteed by the
limited use of violence. Criminal involvement in the recycling
business, for example, has been well covered in the press. OC

families collect bottles illegally from municipal recycling bins and
restaurants, return them at the collection centers claiming twice
the actual numbers, and pocket the change for millions in profits.

Not Your Grandfather's Mob
---------------------------

¶7. (SBU) Despite their notoriety, OC figures have generally been
viewed as a nuisance to be handled by local police. Law enforcement
resources were directed to more existential security threats from
terrorists and enemy states. In recent years, however, the rules of
the game have changed. According to xxxxx, the old school of Israel
OC is giving way to a new, more violent, breed of crime. xxxxx told conoffs that the new style of
crime features knowledge of hi-tech explosives acquired from service
in the Israeli Defense Forces, and a willingness to use
indiscriminate violence, at least against rival gang leaders. New
OC business also includes technology-related crimes, such as stock
market and credit card fraud, and operates on a global scale.

¶8. (SBU) As the reach of Israeli OC has grown, so have the stakes.
Crime families are working further from home and exporting violence
abroad. Older gambling schemes have grown to include sprawling
casino franchises in Eastern Europe. The Abutbul family began its
gambling business in Romania over a decade ago, and now owns the
Europe-wide Casino Royale network. In 2002, Israeli OC turf wars
spilled into Europe when Yaakov Abergil and Felix Abutbul were
killed two months apart. Abutbul was gunned down in front of his
casino in Prague in a show of force by the Abergils as they
attempted to capture a portion of the European gambling market.

¶9. (SBU) Israeli OC now plays a significant role in the global drug
trade, providing both a local consumer market and an important
transit point to Europe and the United States. In 2004, Zeev
Rosenstein was arrested in Israel for possession of 700,000 ecstasy
tablets in his New York apartment, destined for distribution in the
U.S. market. He was ultimately extradited to the United States in
2006, where he is currently serving a 12-year prison sentence. Two
other crime figures, Meir Abergil and Israel Ozifa, are also facing
U.S. extradition charges on charges that include smuggling 100,000
ecstasy tablets into the United States.

¶10. (SBU) The prostitution business has also grown beyond the
neighborhood brothel. In March 2009, the INP arrested twelve
suspects in what is believed to be the largest Israeli-led human
trafficking network unearthed to date. Ring leader Rami Saban and
his associates were charged with smuggling thousands of women from
the former Soviet Union and forcing them to work as prostitutes in
Israel, Cyprus, Belgium, and Great Britain. Some women were flown
to Egypt and smuggled across the Sinai border by Bedouins.

Law Enforcement Steps up the Pressure
-------------------------------------

¶11. (SBU) After years of perceived inaction, in 2008 the INP
created a new unit called Lahav 433. The elite unit operates under
the direct command of the police commissioner, and is charged
specifically with infiltrating and eliminating Israel's major crime
syndicates. Lahav 433 also cooperates closely with district
investigative units to combat smaller criminal organizations, many
of which are aligned with the larger crime families.

¶12. (SBU) Following Alperon's assassination, the INP initiated a
series of raids that led to the arrests of a number of leading crime
figures. Among their targets were Aviv and Adam Abutbul, sons of
crime-family head Charlie Abutbul, both charged with possession of
illegal weapons. (A third brother, Francois, is already facing
murder charges for a nightclub killing in 2004.) Police also
arrested gangland figure Amir Mulner for weapons possession and
conspiracy to commit a crime. Mulner is known to be an explosives
expert by army training, and is a suspect in Yaakov Alperon's
murder. He is also believed to be managing affairs for Rosenstein
while the latter serves his sentence in the United States.

¶13. (SBU) Yaakov Alperon's brother Nissim was arrested with 18
others in December 2008, in what was reported to be a "mafia
meeting" in a Tel Aviv-area caf. According to the Jerusalem Post,
the group may have been planning a revenge attack for his brother's
recent assassination. Alperon's son Dror, recently dismissed from
his army service for disorderly behavior, also faces several counts
of assault and was convicted on extortion charges. Also in
December, police in Netanya launched several raids on illegal
gambling houses and the homes of suspected money launderers with
ties to the crime families. In Ashdod, brothers Roni and David
Harari were arrested on charges of extortion. Regional police stuck
a blow against the Jerusalem Gang, and convicted its leader Itzik
Bar Muha.

Skepticism Hovers Over GOI Efforts
----------------------------------

¶14. (SBU)xxxxx told conoffs that
"thousands of foot soldiers" remain active on the streets despite
these aggressive anti-OC operations. He noted that approximately
2,000 people attended Alperon's very public funeral. xxxxx
expressed skepticism that recent arrests will bear fruit in the long
term without a sustained commitment to enforcement. He noted that
many of the crime leaders remain active while in prison and their
operations are not hampered significantly even when they are
convicted and jailed.

¶15. (SBU) In December 2008, former Prime Minister Olmert himself
admitted that efforts to combat OC have long been diluted among
different agencies, and that INP technology lags far behind that
allocated to security services for counterterrorism. Given the
recent change in government and the current economic crisis, there
is public skepticism as to whether GOI promises to remedy the
situation will be fulfilled. In 2003, following a failed
assassination attempt on Rosenstein, then Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon made similar promises to commit manpower and resources to
combating the problem.

¶16. (SBU) It is not entirely clear to what extent OC elements have
penetrated the Israeli establishment and corrupted public officials.
The INP insists that such instances are rare, despite the
occasional revelation of crooked police officers in the press.
Nevertheless, there have been several dramatic revelations in recent
years that indicate a growing problem. In 2004, former government
minister Gonen Segev was arrested for trying to smuggle thousands of
ecstasy pills into Israel, a case that produced considerable
circumstantial evidence of his involvement in OC. The election of
Inbal Gavrieli to the Knesset in 2003 as a member of Likud raised
concerns about OC influence in the party's Central Committee.
Gavrieli is the daughter of a suspected crime boss, and she
attempted to use her parliamentary immunity to block investigations
into her father's business. (Gavrieli is no longer a member of the
Knesset.) Just last month, Israeli politicos and OC figures came
together for the funeral of Likud party activist Shlomi Oz, who
served time in prison in the 1990s for extortion on behalf of the
Alperon family. Among those in attendance was Omri Sharon, son of
former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who was himself convicted in
2006 on illegal fundraising charges unrelated to OC.

Courts Testing New Powers
--------------------------

¶17. (SBU) In 2003, the GOI passed anti-OC legislation that carries
a maximum sentence of 10 years imprisonment for heading a criminal
organization and three years for working in such an organization.
The law defines such a body as a group of people working in an
"organized, methodical and ongoing pattern to commit offenses that
are defined by the laws of Israel as crimes." The law also allows
for property forfeiture, both in the wake of conviction and in cases
where it is proven to belong to a criminal organization.

¶18. (SBU) Until recently, xxxxx, judges and lawyers have been
slow to make use of this authority, and are hampered by a lack of
resources, insufficient understanding of the tools at their
disposal, and reticence to mete out tough sentences. A witness
protection program for those who testify against OC is just now
getting off the ground, and is not backed by any specific
legislation. Nevertheless, on March 16th, a Tel Aviv district court
took the important step of sentencing 14 convicted criminals
belonging to two mob organizations in Ramle and Jaffa to up to 27
years in prison.

¶19. (SBU) Increased efforts by Israeli authorities to combat OC
have engendered retaliatory threats of violence. Recent press
reports indicate that as many as 10 Israeli judges are currently
receiving 24-hour protection by the police against the threat of
violence from members of crime organizations. Israeli OC appears to
be intent on intimidating judges personally, as a way of influencing
the legal process. Judges in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa have
been assigned police protection, underscoring the depth of the
problem.

Israeli Crime Reaches American Shores
--------------------------------------

¶20. (SBU) Israel's multi-ethnic population provides a deep well of
opportunity for Israeli OC to expand into new territory. Most
Israeli crime families trace their roots to North Africa or Eastern
Europe,[ 1 ]  and many of their Israeli operatives hold foreign passports
allowing them to move freely in European countries, most of which
participate in the visa waiver program with the United States.
Approximately one million Russians moved to Israel following the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, and Russian citizens no longer
require visas to enter Israel. Many Russian oligarchs of Jewish
origin and Jewish members of OC groups have received Israeli
citizenship, or at least maintain residences in the country. Little
is known about the full extent of Russian criminal activity in
Israel, but sources in the police estimate that Russian OC has
laundered as much as USD 10 billion through Israeli holdings. While
most Israeli OC families are native-born and the stereotype that
Russian immigrants tend to be mobsters is greatly overblown,
indigenous OC groups routinely employ "muscle" from the former
Soviet Union.

¶21. (SBU) The profit motive serves as a great unifier among
Israel's diverse demographic groups. According to xxxxx, some
Amsterdam-based Hasidic groups allegedly are implicated in
international drug smuggling through links to Israeli OC. Arab and
Jewish Israeli criminals routinely cooperate and form alliances to
expand control of lucrative drug, car theft and extortion rackets.
Even hostile and closed borders pose few obstacles to OC groups.
According to the INP, 43% of intercepted heroin in 2008 was smuggled
from Lebanon, 37% from Jordan, and 12% from Egypt.

Israeli OC Operating Freely in United States
---------------------------------------------

¶22. (SBU) Given the volume of travel and trade between the United
States and Israel, it is not surprising that Israeli OC has also
gained a foothold in America. Over the last decade, media reports
have detailed a number of high-profile cases involving Israeli OC,
ranging from large-scale drug deals to murder. The ongoing Central
District of California grand jury investigation against the Abergil
family, where a RICO conspiracy case was initiated in December 2007,
best demonstrates the full extent of such criminal activity.
Investigators have linked Yitzhak Abergil and his entire network to
crimes of "embezzlement, extortion, kidnapping, and money
laundering." Yitzhak Abergil is currently under arrest in Israel
and facing extradition for related charges linking him to the murder
of Israeli drug dealer Samy Attias on U.S. soil.

¶23. (SBU) As part of an ongoing effort to track Israeli OC through
media reports and police sources, Post so far has identified 16
families and 78 related individuals who are at the center of Israeli
organized criminal activity. The consular section has revoked
several visas for those who have been convicted of crimes in Israel,
but many OC figures have no prior criminal convictions and carry no
visa ineligibilities. As a result, many hold valid nonimmigrant
visas to the United States and have traveled freely or attempted to
travel for a variety of purposes.

¶24. (SBU) In March 2009, Post received information from law
enforcement authorities that convicted criminal and member of the
Abergil organization, Mordechai Yair Hasin, along with his pregnant
wife and child, was intending to flee Israel for Los Angeles on
valid tourist visas. Hasin's visa was revoked based on his
conviction, as were his family's visas after they were determined to
be intending immigrants.

¶25. (SBU) As in the Hasin case, Post is using every available tool
to limit OC travel to the United States, but such efforts are not
always successful. In June 2008, Post issued Adam Abitbul a valid
tourist visa. Abitbul had no prior criminal convictions, and
carried no visa ineligibilities. Several months later, Post
received information from the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)
that he had traveled to the United States to carry out a hit.
Abitbul returned to Israel prematurely for his father's funeral, at
which time Post revoked his visa. (Post can only revoke the visas of
Israeli citizens while in country.) In a similar case, in October
2008 Post issued Moshe Bar Muha a tourist visa; he claimed to be
traveling for medical treatment. Post subsequently received
information from the LAPD that Bar Muha is in fact the brother of
Itzik Bar Muha of the Jerusalem Gang (see above) and a convicted
criminal.

¶26. (SBU) As recently as March 2009, Zvika Ben Shabat, Yaacov
Avitan, and Tzuri Rokah requested visas to attend a
"security-related convention" in Las Vegas. According to local
media reports, all three had involvement with OC. Post asked the
applicants to provide police reports for any criminal records in
Israel, but without such evidence there is no immediate
ineligibility for links to OC. Luckily, all three have so far
failed to return for continued adjudication of their applications.
Nevertheless, it is fair to assume that many known OC figures hold
valid tourist visas to the United States and travel freely.

Comment: Israeli OC Slipping Through the Consular Cracks
--------------------------------------------- ---------

¶27. (SBU) Given the growing reach and lethal methods of Israeli OC,
blocking the travel of known OC figures to the United States is a
matter of great concern to Post. Through collaboration with Israeli
and U.S. law enforcement authorities, Post has developed an
extensive database and placed lookouts for OC figures and their foot
soldiers. Nevertheless, the above visa cases demonstrate the
challenges that have arisen since the termination of the Visas Shark
in September 2008. Unlike OC groups from the former Soviet Union,
Italy, China, and Central America, application of INA
212(a)(3)(A)(ii) against Israeli OC is not specifically authorized
per Foreign Affairs Manual 40.31 N5.3. As such, Israelis who are
known to work for or belong to OC families are not automatically
ineligible for travel to the United States.

Cunningham
HEADER VZCZCXYZ0018
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTV #1098/01 1351414
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY AD66A605 MSI9229-632)
R 151414Z MAY 09 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1845
INFO RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 2041
RUCNFB/FBI WASHDC//INTD/CTD/CT WATCH//
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHDC
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC 0068
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 7509

XTAGS: XTAGCVIS, XTAGSNAR, XTAGCMGT, XTAGKFRD, XTAGKCOR, XTAGKCRM, XTAGKTIP, XTAGPINR, XTAGIS
ADDED 2010-12-01 21:09:00
VOTE_POINTS 18
VOTE_COUNT 3
VOTE_RATING 6000
PRIORITY RR

 

 

Notes de l'Editeur :

[ 1 ] Il est ici fait allusion à la " Zwi Migdal" qui apparait dans l'Empire Russe au XIX éme siècle et qui étendra ses ramifications jusqu'en Amérique Latine et sur tout le pourtour de la Mer Noire particulièremment sur l'axe Odessa - Trebzonde , lire " Les Chemins de Buenos Aires " d'Albert Londres et " The Jewish White Slave Trade and the Untold Story of Raquel Liberman."

 

 Le premier film à évoquer cette criminalité juive organisée est un film danois de 1910 : Den hvide Slavehandel , " la traite des blanches " .[ voir video ]

Les récentes affaires de trafic d'organes découvertes au Kossovo ménent toutes à des cliniques localisées en Israël et ont vu l'arrestation de médecins Israeliens .

Aux Etats-Unis la période de la prohibition souvent associée à la mafia Italo-Americaine en la personne d' " Al Capone " est en fait l'âge d'or de la criminalité juive en bande organisée - qui prend naissance à la fin du XIX éme siècle avec l'arrivée d'immigrants juifs en provenance de l'Empire Russe fuyant les " pogroms Tsaristes " -  avec des figures comme Dutch Schultz [ né  Arthur Flegenheimer ] et Bugsy Siegel .

Une nouvelle vague est apparue , désignée sous le nom de " mafia Russe " , apres l'implosion de l'URSS en 1991 mais ces " Russes " là n'ont jamais servi le vin de messe au couvent  de Novodivechi lors des cérémonies de la Grande Pâques Orthodoxe pas plus que leurs prédecesseurs des années 1880- 1910 !

En France la criminialté juive en bande organisée a été révélèe lors des affaires de " cavalerie financière " du Sentier .

 

  Sur le simple plan de l'analyse géopolitique , et à ce titre il est parfaitement licite de l'évoquer sur ce blogue , ce télegramme révéle le rôle de plus en plus importants des " acteurs non-étatiques " dont les organisations criminelles dans les relations internationales . Ce rôle est d'autant plus important lorsque ces acteurs s'organisent autour d'intêrets communautaires ( religieux ou ethniques ) au delà des simples intêrets économiques , ce qui les rend d'autant plus difficile à combattre car les populations de ces communautés ethniques ou religieuses par simle effet d'empathie et de solidarité communautaire protègent ces criminels .

Les alliances conclues entre ces groupes mafieux communautaires avec des groupes qui à l'aune de l'analyse géopolitique traditionelle semblent contre-natures - ici les liens entre la criminalité juive et arabo-muslmane ( certains bédouins du Sinaï ) - ont été analysées dans l'histoire Européenne par l'historien Russe Lev Goumilev qui a décortiqué l'alliance conclue entre les Radhanites et les Vikings contre les Etats Européens .

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Voir les commentaires

Rédigé par DanielB

Publié dans #Le courrier diplomatique

Repost0

Publié le 3 Décembre 2010

En raison d'attaques de déni de service , le site de WikiLeaks est indisponible momentanément .

Je vous propose en compagnie de mes amis de Plano Brasil de vous rendre sur le moteur de recherche  suivant et tapper le mot clef qui vous intéresse !

Ensemble , faisons tout pour que WikiLeaks vive et puisse continuer de publier ses informations  !

 

CableSearch BETA

Embassy Cables Fulltext Search

 

 

 

 

 

Voir les commentaires

Rédigé par DanielB

Publié dans #Le courrier diplomatique

Repost0

Publié le 3 Décembre 2010

D'aprés Reuters :

La France a lancé vendredi une procédure visant à mettre fin à l'hébergement sur son territoire du site internet WikiLeaks abrité depuis jeudi par le serveur français OVH, a annoncé le ministère de l'Industrie.

Le ministre de l'Industrie et de l'Economie numérique, Eric Besson, a saisi une autorité administrative pour lui demander de lui indiquer les modalités techniques de cette action.

Dans un message sur le forum internet de sa société, Octave Klaba, dirigeant d'OVH, annonce qu'il saisit la justice pour trancher sur la légalité de WikiLeaks en France et donc sur l'éventuel problème que poserait son hébergement.

Le site WikiLeaks diffuse depuis quelques jours des télégrammes diplomatiques américains secrets ou confidentiels, provoquant une vague de protestations des Etats-Unis.

"La France ne peut héberger des sites internet qui violent ainsi le secret des relations diplomatiques et mettent en danger des personnes protégées par le secret diplomatique", écrit Eric Besson dans un courrier transmis à la presse.

"Elle ne peut pas héberger les sites internet qualifiés de criminels et rejetés par d'autres Etats en raison des atteintes qu'ils portent à leurs droits fondamentaux", ajoute le ministre.

Le courrier est adressé au Conseil général de l'industrie, de l'énergie et des technologiques, organe administratif placé sous l'autorité du ministère de l'Economie.

Eric Besson souhaite que tous les opérateurs ayant participé à l'hébergement puissent être d'abord "sensibilisés aux conséquences de leurs actes, et dans un deuxième temps placés devant leurs responsabilités".

Dans son message, le patron d'OVH précise que l'hébergement s'est fait par l'intermédiaire d'un client qui a commandé un serveur dédié, pour la somme de 150 euros, payée par carte bancaire en ligne.

WIKILEAKS VOYAGE SUR INTERNET

Il dit avoir saisi la justice référé pour trancher. "Ce n'est pas au monde politique ni à OVH de demander ou de décider la fermeture ou pas d'un site mais à la justice. Nous espérons que le juge donnera sa décision avant ce soir ou demain et OVH appliquera la décision immédiatement", explique-t-il.

OVH est un serveur privé, qui permet de fabriquer des sites, de les héberger et de délivrer des noms de domaine.

La mesure française, si elle mise en oeuvre, risque de n'avoir que peu d'effet pratique.

WikiLeaks, initialement hébergé sur le serveur américain Amazon, voyage sur internet et a annoncé vendredi matin sur Twitter qu'il pouvait être consulté à une nouvelle adresse, http://wikileaks.ch, gérée par un réseau universitaire suisse.

WikiLeaks a passé par ailleurs des accords avec plusieurs grands journaux mondiaux, dont Le Monde en France, qui ont analysé les documents diplomatiques et en fournissent depuis dimanche soir des analyses et des morceaux choisis.

La France est concernée en partie par les documents, qui ont révélé en particulier que Nicolas Sarkozy avait annoncé sa candidature à la présidentielle de 2007 à l'ambassadeur des Etats-Unis un an avant de la rendre publique dans son pays, et qu'il envisageait en 2006 un engagement militaire en Irak .

A titre de solidarité avec l'organisation WikiLeaks , je vais donc publier l'intégralité de deux depêches : La première sera baptisée : " Sarkozyy l'Americain " et la deuxième "  Les visiteurs du soir ".[ Celle-ci concernant la visite des juges RICARD et BRUGGIERE sera mise en ligne des un fonctionnement correct du serveur de WikiLeaks  ]



Je soussigné  Daniel BESSON demeurant à MARSEILLE  déclare agire en parfaite connaissance de cause des poursuites judiciares auxquelles je m'expose :

 

O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 005335


SIPDIS

 

STATE FOR EUR, DRL, AND EB
COMMERCE FOR ITA
LABOR FOR ILAB
NSC FOR TRACY MCKIBBEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2015
TAGS: PREL ECON EFIN ELAB PGOV FR
SUBJECT: ALLAN HUBBARD'S CALL ON INTERIOR MINISTER SARKOZY

REF: PARIS 5232

Classified By: Ambassador Craig R. Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d
).

¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  Ambassador Stapleton and National Economic
Council Director Allan Hubbard met with Interior Minister
Nicolas Sarkozy on August 1.  Sarkozy expressed his
admiration for President Bush and said he looked forward to
the opportunity to tackle France's economic and social
problems with the same directness for which the President is
justly famous.  Sarkozy confirmed that he would be running
for President of France in 2007.  He said his own struggle to
rise to high office, as the son of immigrants challenging
entrenched elites, in part explained his deep admiration for
America's values.  He said he would stress opportunity and
making a "deep break with the past" -- by proposing
significant change to France's social model -- in his 2007
campaign.  On economic issues, Sarkozy reprised many of his
now familiar policy themes: France's economic model holds
back growth; people need to work more and be rewarded for
doing so; and people need to be told the truth about the
economic situation.  He was upbeat
about France's future if the country seized the opportunity
that reforms could bring.  He also tossed out a few of the
"policy zingers" for which he is well known, notably "The
European Central Bank confuses a strong currency with a
strong economy," and "France needs to do what Reagan did in
the U.S., Thatcher in Britain, and Gonzales in Spain."  End
Summary.

¶2.  (U) Ambassador Stapleton and Allan Hubbard, Director of
the National Economic Council, met with France's Minister of
Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy on 1 August.  Sarkozy is also the
president of the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) party, a
coalition of center-right parties founded by President Chirac
in 2002.  The meeting took place in Sarkozy's office at the
Ministry of the Interior and was also attended by Sarkozy
Chief of Staff Claude Gueant and Interior Ministry Staffer
Cederic Goubet.  Embassy Econ Counselor, Poloff and Economic
Analyst (as interpreter) accompanied Mr. Hubbard and
Ambassador Stapleton.

ADMIRATION FOR PRESIDENT BUSH
-----------------------------
¶3.  (C) Sarkozy expressed his admiration for President Bush.
Sarkozy said that, like the President, he too was committed
to keeping his word and to dealing honestly with the real
problems of the country, "unlike the rest of those
politicians."  Throughout the hour-long meeting, Sarkozy
returned again and again to the importance of leveling with
people.  He illustrated his point by saying the "French
people have to be told the truth -- and they want to hear
it."  He added that most politicians, and specifically
President Chirac, just keep stringing the people along with
their "constant tergiversating."  Economic Council Director
Hubbard's presentation of the President's direct and
principled tackling of America's major domestic challenges
(taxes, social security, education), drew the high compliment
from Sarkozy that he too would like to tackle the same
problems, in the same way, for France.

DISAGREEING WITH VERSUS UNDERCUTTING THE U.S.
---------------------------------------------
¶4.  (C) Sarkozy lamented the troubled state of U.S.-France
relations during recent years.  He drew a sharp distinction
between disagreeing with friends and undercutting them.  He
said, "we should always be able to disagree."  Calling it
something he "would never do", he cited President Chirac's,
and then-Foreign Minister de Villepin's, use of France's
Security Council veto against the U.S. in February 2002 as an
unjustifiable and excessive reaction to a difference of
views.  He added that he would have advised the U.S. not to
undertake the invasion and occupation of Iraq -- but that
that didn't prevent him from "feeling it personally when
American soldiers die in combat."  He proudly pointed out
how, at the height of anti-American feeling and anti-U.S.
demonstrations (contemporaneous to Sarkozy's first stint as
Minister of the Interior (2002 - 2004)), he took it as a
personal responsibility to see to it that "no U.S. Embassy or
Consulate was so much as touched" by demonstrators.

IDENTIFYING WITH AMERICA'S VALUES
---------------------------------
¶5.  (C) "They call me 'Sarkozy the American,'" he said, "they
consider it an insult, but I take it as a compliment."
Sarkozy stressed how much he "recognized himself" in
America's values.  He recalled how as a boy, he told his
father that he wanted to grow up to be president.  He said
his Hungarian-born father retorted, "In that case, go to
America -- because with a name like Sarkozy, you'll never
make it here."  Proving that wrong, Sarkozy said, was a
touchstone for his efforts both to succeed and to transform
France into a place where "outsiders" like him could also
enjoy opportunity untrammeled by prejudice.  Comment:  Very
much unlike nearly all other French political figures,
Sarkozy is viscerally pro-American.  For most of his peers
the U.S. is a sometimes reviled or admired, but decidedly
foreign, other.  Sarkozy identifies with America; he sees his
own rise in the world as reflecting an American-like saga.
End Comment.

FIGHTING FRANCE'S ELITE
-----------------------
¶6.  (C) Sarkozy pointed to his own political career as an
example of both his success and the difficulty of achieving
it.  "I'm not a member of the elite...I'm someone who wants
to speak for the France that gets up every morning and
works," he said, as he recalled his own rise from "knowing
nobody and beginning as a simple party supporter, and
climbing every step in the ladder" to his current bid for the
presidency.  With some vehemence, Sarkozy insisted on his
having had to "challenge those stronger than me" every step
of way.

CONFIRMING HE WILL RUN
----------------------
¶7.  (C) Sarkozy confirmed his intention to run for president
to Ambassador Stapleton and NEC Director Hubbard, saying, "I
am going to be a candidate in 2007".  Outlining his campaign
strategy, Sarkozy said, "we are going to propose change to
the French people."  "I'm convinced that it can work...people
want to believe they can succeed."  Sarkozy then touched on
many of his specific proposals for providing more opportunity
for the able and more support for the disadvantaged -- tax
cuts, labor law reform, affirmative action, immigration
reform, and monetary policy that "recognizes that the
currency is an instrument for supporting a strong economy."

RECALLING REAGAN, THATCHER AND GONZALES
---------------------------------------
¶8.  (C) On economic affairs, Sarkozy repeated his
often-stated assertion that the French economic model is
"bad."  France needs to do what Spain, the UK and other
successful countries have done over the past twenty years;
take the best of what they have done and adopt those policies
in France.  In response to Mr. Hubbard's question on what
Sarkozy's economic vision for France was, Sarkozy said that
the French people have to understand that they need to work
more and that the Government must make it more profitable for
people who do so.  He said that France needed to a go through
a period similar to the U.S. under Reagan, the UK under
Thatcher, and Spain under Gonzalez.  "France is not an old
country," he said, "but right now it's acting like one."

INCENTIVES FOR TAKING INITIATIVE
--------------------------------
¶9.  (C) Sarkozy explained his theory that unemployment
benefits should be higher than they currently are for people
immediately after they are laid off.  However they should
quickly phase out to provide an incentive for people to look
for work.  Unemployed people should be required to look for
work; now they are not required to.  Echoing comments made by
Finance Minister Breton, Sarkozy said, "people are ready for
the politics of truth."  He added that his directly expressed
assessments of France's economic problems and his insistent
advocacy of work, innovation and entrepreneurship in fact
contribute to his popularity.  "Some people told me never to
say such things, people will hate you; clearly they don't
hate me," he observed.

OVER-VALUED EURO AND NO ALAN GREENSPAN
--------------------------------------
10  (C) On the deficit, Sarkozy said that for 25 years France
has been living beyond its means.  Now it is paying the price
for that.  He said that the U.S. had two advantages that
France did not have: "Greenspan and the dollar."  He said
that France was suffering from no longer having control of
its own currency and observed that European Central Bank
(ECB) president Trichet was pursuing exactly the wrong
policies; "he confuses a strong currency with a strong
economy."  Europe needed a pro-growth ECB, not one focused on
fighting inflation only.  The U.S., he observed, "has often
had its strongest economy when the dollar was at its
weakest."  Turning to Chairman Greenspan, Sarkozy said, "he
is a genius. A genius.  He has pursued exactly the right
policies."

FRANCE'S ECONOMIC CHALLENGES
----------------------------
¶11.  (C) Returning to his priorities for France, Sarkozy
noted that France's biggest challenges were outsourcing, a
lagging research sector, savings that are "too static and
don't really help move the economy," and a lack of profitable
mid-size companies; "we have lots of big ones and lots of
really small ones, but few in between."  He sees natural
strengths for France in the health, agriculture and food,
transportation, communication and nuclear energy sectors.

WORKING TOGETHER AT THE WTO
---------------------------
¶12.  (C) Responding to Mr. Hubbard's observation on the need
for the Doha trade round to move forward this autumn, Sarkozy
agreed, and noted that the EU needed to reach a better
understanding with the U.S. on agricultural issues.  He said
that U.S. and EU officials were talking but prescribed much
more intensive discussion so that a common understanding
could be reached.  If that happened, he believed the upcoming
Hong Kong ministerial could be a success.

COMMENT
-------
¶13.  (C) For many years, Nicolas Sarkozy has been France's
most popular politician.  Current polls show his approval
ratings holding steady at around 60 percent, and defeating
any probable opponent in 2007.  By experience and conviction
-- his experience as interior minister and his "liberal,"
free-market oriented convictions -- he seems particularly
well-suited to lead France in meeting the key challenges it
now faces: security in this era of global terrorism and
prosperity in this era of adapting to economic globalization.
In addition, Sarkozy's deep identification with American
values -- opportunity, initiative, competition, society that
sustains individual liberty as much as it supports national
power, make him France's best hope for catalyzing the shift
in social values that the French need to make if they are to
take full advantage of globalization.

COMMENT CONTINUED
-----------------
¶14. (C) Sarkozy's vision for France is a powerful one, and,
as his popularity reflects, it resonates with a big part of
the electorate.  However, resistance to social change is
particularly strong in France.  Attachment to the benefits
and advantages that most of them receive, in one way of
another, from the state -- the substance of the "French
social model" -- is very strong among ordinary French people.
Sarkozy's popularity may be a reflection of change the
French would like to make, but are too conservative to in
fact undertake.  End Comment.
STAPLETON

 

Voir les commentaires

Rédigé par DanielB

Publié dans #Le courrier diplomatique

Repost0

Publié le 1 Décembre 2010

Les fuites révélées par l'organisation Wikileaks en provenance de l'ambassade Etasunienne de Brasilia et du consulat de Sao-Paulo révélent que les Etats-Unis et Israël veulent profiter des craintes sécuritaires entourant la tenue de la coupe du monde de football en 2014 et des Jeux Olympiques en 2016 au Brésil pour favoriser leurs entreprises du domaine de la sécurité et en particulier dans le domaine de la sécurité informatique  .

La tenue de la coupe du Monde et des JO qui ferait  prendre conscience à certaines autorités politiques Brésiliennes la possibilité de menaces terroristes serait aussi une " excellente opportunité " d'augmenter les échanges d'informations et la coopération bilatérale en matière de terrorisme .

La question de la sécurité de ces deux manifestations sportives a été évoquée par Shimon Peres lors de sa dernière visite au Brésil , celui étant accompagné par plusieurs responsables du secteur militaro-industriel Israelien .

 

Analyse de l'Editeur :

Au delà de la simple opportunité économique que constitue le " marché de la peur " liè à la Coupe du Monde de football en 2014 et aux Jeux Olympiques de Rio en 2016  , celui-ci permet aux Etats-Unis et éventuellement à Israël la pénétration des organes de sécurité intérieurs et extérieurs Brésiliens dont l'ABIN , ceci dans le cadre de la " coppération en matière de sécurité " et l' " échange d'informations " .

Les firmes Etasuniennes et Israéliennes spécialisées dans le domaine de la biomètrie par exemple peuvent à l'insu des gouvernements constituer des fichiers biométriques parallèles qui seeont exploités par la communauté sécuritaire Etasunienne et Israelienne  .

Le cas Brésilien n'est pas unique et on pourrait ainsi évoquer le cas de la France et du juge J.L.BRUGGIERE qui selon les révélations de Wikileaks en provenance de l'ambassade de Paris se comporte comme un véritable " honorable correspondant " à la solde - on peut legitimement se poser la question s'il n' y a pas eu échanges d'argent ou de services -  des services de sécurité Etasuniens . Encore qu'ici le qualificatif d' " honorable " mériterait d'être fortement nuancé .

De manière plus sournoise , cette prise de contrôle de nos organes de sécurité intérieurs et extérieurs  , des administrations [ Justice , Douanes , ... ] via des proxys rigoureusement selectionnés réoriente nos politiques de sécurité vers des missions qui ne tiennent pas compte des interets premiers de nos citoyens et de la France : Si la France excelle au niveau du renseignement en ce qui concerne ce que l'on appelle le " terrorisme international " , de nombreux analystes comme Xavier Raufer pointent notre indigence  en ce qui concerne le renseignement en relation avec sécurité intérieure " traditionelle " , celle en rapport   " les violences urbaines " .

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Voir les commentaires

Rédigé par DanielB

Publié dans #Le courrier diplomatique

Repost0